

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI  
 AT KANSAS CITY**

**COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH OF )  
 PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT )  
 PLAINS, et al., )  
 Plaintiffs, )  
 v. ) **Case No. 2416-CV31931**  
 ) **Division 3**  
 STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., )  
 Defendants. )**

**ORDER**

NOW on this day, the Court takes up Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, or, In the Alternative, Temporary Restraining Order filed on November 6, 2024, and State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filed on November 25, 2024. The Court held a hearing on said Motions on December 4, 2024. Plaintiffs Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains and Planned Parenthood Great Rivers-Missouri appeared by Eleanor Spottswood, Esq., Camila Vega, Esq., Jennifer Sandman, Esq., Gillian Wilcox, Esq. and Chelsea Tejada, Esq. Defendants State of Missouri, Michael Parson, Andrew Bailey, Department of Health and Senior Services, Paula Nickelson, Missouri Division of Professional Registration - Healing Arts, Jade James-Halbert, Dorothy Munch, Jeffrey Carter, Ian Fawks, Naveed Razzaque, Mark Taormina, Christopher Wilhelm, Missouri Division of Professional Registration – Board of Nursing, Julie Miller, Trevor Wolfe, Margaret Bultas, Bonny Kehm, Courtney Owens and Denise Williams (hereinafter “State Defendants”), appeared by Joshua Divine, Esq., Dominic Barceleau, Esq., and Michael Patton, Esq. Defendant Jean Peters Baker appeared by Amanda Langenheim, Esq. and Joyce Johnson, Esq. After reviewing the Court’s file including motions, accompanying Suggestions, affidavits,<sup>1</sup> stipulated facts, and hearing argument of counsel and being apprised on the relevant law, the Court

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiffs and State Defendants agreed to the submission of affidavits for the purposes of this hearing only.

finds that Plaintiffs' Motion should be and is hereby, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be and is hereby, DENIED.

### PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following the passage of The Right to Reproductive Freedom Initiative (hereinafter "Amendment 3") in the general election held on November 5, 2024, counsel for Plaintiffs filed their Petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief (hereinafter "Petition") along with their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, or in the Alternative, Temporary Restraining Order (hereinafter "Motion for Preliminary Injunction") on November 6, 2024.<sup>2</sup> Defendants were served shortly thereafter and, in light of Plaintiffs' request for expedited hearing, the Court held a Case Management Conference on November 15, 2024, wherein the Court established a briefing schedule and set Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction for hearing on December 4, 2024.

On November 18, 2024, State Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss Defendant Baker and Transfer Venue, along with their Motion to Expedite Ruling and Shorten Time to Respond, which was granted on November 19, 2024. Parties were given until November 22, 2024 to file a response to the Motion to Dismiss and Transfer Venue, with a Reply due by November 25, 2024. That Motion was also set for hearing on December 4, 2024. The Court has now ruled on that Motion by Order dated December 4, 2024 and will not further address it herein.

On November 25, 2024, State Defendants filed an additional Motion to Dismiss, directed at the merits of Plaintiffs' Petition. State Defendants' Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, also filed on November 25, 2024, addressed both their opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion and also provided Suggestions in Support of State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' filed their Reply Suggestions in Support of their Motion for

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<sup>2</sup> Plaintiffs' counsel also filed a Motion to Certify a Defendant Class which the Court has addressed in a separate Order.

Preliminary Injunction or, in the Alternative, Temporary Restraining Order, and Suggestions in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on December 2, 2024. Due to the overlapping issues involved in Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court, with the agreement of the parties, heard argument on both Motions on December 4, 2024.

### AMENDMENT 3

On November 5, 2024, Missouri voters approved Amendment 3 by majority vote. Election results were certified on December 5, 2024. Amendment 3 is now Article I, Section 36 of the Missouri Constitution. It states as follows:

Section 36.1. This Section shall be known as "The Right to Reproductive Freedom Initiative."

2. The Government shall not deny or infringe upon a person's fundamental right to reproductive freedom, which is the right to make and carry out decisions about all matters relating to reproductive health care, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, abortion care, miscarriage care, and respectful birthing conditions.

3. The right to reproductive freedom shall not be **denied, interfered with, delayed, or otherwise restricted** unless the Government demonstrates that such action is justified by a **compelling governmental interest** achieved by the **least restrictive means**. **Any denial, interference, delay, or restriction of the right to reproductive freedom shall be presumed invalid.** For purposes of this Section, a **governmental interest is compelling only if it is for the limited purpose and has the limited effect of improving or maintaining the health of a person seeking care, is consistent with widely accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and does not infringe on that person's autonomous decision-making.**

4. Notwithstanding subsection 3 of this Section, the general assembly may enact laws that regulate the provision of abortion after Fetal Viability provided that under no circumstance shall the Government deny, interfere with, delay, or otherwise restrict an abortion that in the good faith judgment of a treating health care professional is needed to protect the life or physical or mental health of the pregnant person.

5. No person shall be penalized, prosecuted, or otherwise subjected to adverse action based on their actual, potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes, including but not limited to miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion. Nor shall any person assisting a person in exercising their right to reproductive freedom with that person's consent be penalized, prosecuted, or otherwise subjected to adverse action for doing so.

6. The Government shall not discriminate against persons providing or obtaining reproductive health care or assisting another person in doing so.

7. If any provision of this Section or the application thereof to anyone or to any circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of those provisions and the application of such provisions to others or other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

8. For purposes of this Section, the following terms mean:

(1) "Fetal Viability", the point in pregnancy when, in the good faith judgment of a treating health care professional and based on the particular facts of the case, there is a significant likelihood of the fetus's sustained survival outside the uterus without the application of extraordinary medical measures.

(2) "Government",

a. the state of Missouri; or

b. any municipality, city, town, village, township, district, authority, public subdivision or public corporation having the power to tax or regulate, or any portion of two or more such entities within the state of Missouri.

(emphasis added).

### STANDING

Missouri has a number of statutes and regulations governing the provision of abortions and abortion care. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from prosecuting and enforcing some of these laws. Plaintiffs allege the challenged laws in this matter penalize Plaintiffs for providing reproductive health care. It is uncontested that Plaintiffs assist patients in exercising their right to abortion and that Plaintiffs would be subject to criminal penalties for violating the challenged laws.

The Court finds Plaintiffs have standing in this matter. Plaintiffs also have third party standing to bring claims on behalf of their patients. *Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo., Inc. v. Nixon*, 220 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Mo. banc 2007) (“Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers have repeatedly been allowed to assert third party standing on behalf of their minor patients.”); *see also*, *June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo*, 591 U.S. 299, 318 (2020) (“We have long permitted abortion providers to invoke the rights of their actual or potential patients in challenges to abortion-related regulations.”), *abrogated on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.*, 597 U.S. 215 (2022).

### STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 92.02 and Chapter 526 of the Missouri Revised Statutes govern injunctive relief where “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result in the absence of relief.” Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 92.02(1). In order for a preliminary injunction to be granted, the Court must consider four factors: I) the movant’s probability of success on the merits; II) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant absent the injunction; III) the balance between this harm and the injury that the injunction’s issuance would inflict on other interested parties; and IV) the public interest. *State ex rel. Dir. Of Revenue, State of Mo. v. Gabbert*, 925 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Mo. banc 1996) (internal citations omitted).

It is the movant’s obligation to justify the court’s exercise of such an extraordinary remedy. *Gabbert* at 839. The movant must show that the probability of success on the merits and irreparable harm decidedly outweigh any potential harm to the other party or to the public interest if a stay is issued. *Id.* Of course, this inquiry should not be rigid or “wooden” and cannot be accomplished with “mathematical precision.” *Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc.*, 640 F.2d 109, 113

(8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981). “The equitable nature of the proceeding mandates that the court’s approach be flexible enough to encompass the particular circumstances of each case.” *Id.*

I. Probability of Success on the Merits

A movant must make some showing of probability of success on the merits before a preliminary injunction will be issued. *Gabbert* at 839. The Eighth Circuit has specifically rejected (and Missouri courts have adopted) the contention that the party seeking preliminary relief prove a “greater than fifty per cent likelihood that he [or she] will prevail on the merits.” *Dataphase Systems, Inc.* at 113. Rather, the likelihood that movant ultimately prevails “is meaningless in isolation” and courts must examine this in the “context of the relative injuries to the parties and the public.” *Id.* Where the balance of other factors tip decidedly toward movant, a preliminary injunction may issue if movant has raised questions so serious and difficult as to “call for more deliberative investigation.” *Id.* (reversing district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction where the court failed to find movant would suffer irreparable harm nor that there was substantial probability that movant would prevail at trial).

“A statute’s validity is presumed, and a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes some constitutional provision.” *Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo., Inc. v. Nixon*, 220 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing *Doe v. Phillips*, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. banc 2006)). However, if a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, the statute must be declared invalid. *Jackson County v. State*, 207 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. banc 2006). A statute cannot supersede, nor can judicial interpretation thereof, abrogate a constitutional right. *Doe v. Phillips*, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. banc 2006); *United C.O.D. v. State*, 150 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Mo. banc 2004) (“Courts will enforce a statute unless it plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution.”) “Words used in constitutional provisions are interpreted to give

effect to their plain, ordinary, and natural meaning.” *Faatz v. Ashcroft*, 685 S.W.3d 388, 400 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal citation omitted). In light of this guidance, the Court will assess Plaintiffs’ probability of success by reviewing the language of the challenged statutes through the heightened scrutiny framework provided in the language of Amendment 3, namely, whether the government’s purported compelling interest (one that is “for the limited purpose and has the limited effect of improving or maintaining the health of a person seeking care, is consistent with widely accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and does not infringe on that person’s autonomous decision-making”) is achieved by the least restrictive means.

## II. The Threat of Irreparable Harm

“The United States Supreme Court has held being subject to an unconstitutional statute, ‘for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” *Rebman v. Parson*, 576 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). An injunction may issue “to prevent the doing of any legal wrong whatever, whenever in the opinion of the court an adequate remedy cannot be afforded by an action for damages.” § 526.030 RSMo.<sup>3</sup> Injunctive relief is unavailable unless irreparable harm is otherwise likely to result, *see City of Grandview v. Moore*, 481 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Mo. App. 1972), and plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. *See State ex rel. Taylor v. Anderson*, 242 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Mo. 1951). Irreparable harm can also be established if monetary remedies cannot provide adequate compensation for improper conduct. *Peabody Holding Co., Inc. v. Costain Grp. PLC*, 813 F. Supp. 1402, 1421 (E.D. Mo. 1993). Movant need not show that damages have accrued, only that there is a threat of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. *Id.*

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<sup>3</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations refer to the 2016 edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, updated through the 2023 Cumulative Supplement.

The threat of irreparable harm is especially apparent in the context of abortion care, because it is a decision and procedure that “simply cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching consequences.” *Bellotti v. Baird*, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). Where the statutes at issue unquestionably conflict with the newly established rights afforded by Amendment 3, because they “den[y], interfer[e] with, dela[y], or otherwise restric[t]” the right to reproductive freedom, irreparable injury has been established. Mo. Cont. Art. I, §36.3.

### III. Balance of Harm versus Injury to Other Interested Parties

In order to obtain injunctive relief, movants need only show that the balance of equities tips in their favor. *Peabody Holding Co., Inc. v. Costain Grp. PLC*, 813 F. Supp. 1402, 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (citing *Dataphase Systems Inc.*, 640 F.2d 109, 113-14 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981)). The balance-of-harms and public-interest factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). State Defendants argue that preliminarily enjoining the laws at issue would also impose irreparable harm on the State, whose legislature has democratically enacted these laws. “[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (quoting *New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.*, 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). It is this alleged harm the Court needs to balance against the alleged irreparable harm incurred by Plaintiffs. As Plaintiffs argue, they and their patients are suffering serious harm, whereas Defendants only stand to lose the ability temporarily to enforce some laws that are likely to be held unconstitutional and which further no valid compelling state interest. *See Kirkeby v. Furness*, 52 F.3d 772, 775 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (public interest favored injunction against unconstitutional ordinance).



IV. The Public Interest

Amendment 3 was passed by a majority vote on November 5, 2024, the results of which were certified on December 5, 2024. *See* Plaintiffs’ Supplement Notice of Authority filed on December 5, 2024. By the language of Amendment 3, the public interest is clear that voters, i.e. the public, intended to create a new fundamental right to reproductive freedom for all Missourians, “which is the right to make and carry out decisions about all matters relating to reproductive health care, including but not limited to prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, abortion care, miscarriage care, and respectful birthing conditions.” Mo. Const. Art. I, 36.2. It is this public interest that the Court must consider when weighing the factors for preliminary injunction, as provided above.

**LEGAL ANALYSIS**

For the sake of clarity, the Court will address each category of statutes at issue as they are discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, as provided below:

1. Missouri’s Abortion Bans: The Total Ban, § 188.017 RSMo; Gestational Age Bans, §§ 188.056, 188.057, 188.058, 188.375, RSMo; and Reasons Ban §§ 188.038, 188.052 RSMo., 19 C.S.R. § 10-15.010(1).<sup>4</sup>

a. Total Ban. Section 188.017 provides, in pertinent part, that

...no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a woman, except in cases of medical emergency...[and a]ny person who knowingly performs or induces an abortion of an unborn child in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B felony, as well as subject to suspension or revocation of his or her professional license by his or her professional licensing board.... § 188.017.2 RSMo.

The Court finds the plain language of this statute is directly at odds with Amendment 3, specifically, Art. I, § 36.2 of the Missouri Constitution. Pursuant to Art. I § 36.3, the statute is

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<sup>4</sup> The State Defendants concede the Total Ban and Gestational Age Bans are no longer enforceable and argue that a preliminary injunction on this issue is not needed because there is no controversy. However, Peters Baker remains as a Defendant and has not conceded the same.

therefore presumptively invalid and, because the State Defendants have not demonstrated that the statute is justified by a compelling governmental interest achieved by the least restrictive means, this Court finds that success on the merits is likely. Further, because “being subject to an unconstitutional statute, ‘for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury,’” the threat of irreparable harm exists here. The parties do not articulate, and this Court does not find, that issuance of this injunction would inflict harm and injury on other interested parties. The Court also finds that the public interest, as illustrated by the majority who voted to pass Amendment 3, is on the side of granting this injunction. Therefore, the Court finds that Section 188.017 must be enjoined.

b. Gestational Age Bans. Section 188.056 provides, in pertinent part,

...no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a woman at **eight weeks gestational age** or later, except in cases of medical emergency... [and a]ny person who knowingly performs or induces an abortion of an unborn child in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B felony, as well as subject to suspension or revocation of his or her professional license by his or her professional licensing board.... § 188.056.1. RSMo. (emphasis added).

Likewise, Section 188.057 provides, in part,

...no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a woman at **fourteen weeks gestational age** or later, except in cases of medical emergency... [and a]ny person who knowingly performs or induces an abortion of an unborn child in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B felony, as well as subject to suspension or revocation of his or her professional license by his or her professional licensing board.... § 188.057.1. RSMo. (emphasis added).

Section 188.058 provides, in part,

...no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a woman at **eighteen weeks gestational age** or later, except in cases of medical emergency... [and a]ny person who knowingly performs or induces an abortion of an unborn child in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B felony, as well as subject to suspension or revocation of his or her professional license by his or her professional licensing board.... § 188.058.1 RSMo. (emphasis added).

Finally, Section 188.375 provides, in part,

...no abortion shall be performed or induced upon a woman carrying a late-term pain-capable unborn child [defined in § 188.375.2 as “unborn child at **twenty weeks gestational age** or later”], except in cases of medical emergency... [and a]ny person who knowingly performs or induces an abortion of a late-term pain-capable unborn child in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a class B felony, as well as subject to suspension or revocation of his or her professional license by his or her professional licensing board. § 188.375.3 RSMo. (emphasis added).

As with the Total Ban, these statutes are clearly contrary to the language of Amendment 3 in that they infringe on a person’s “autonomous decision making” and violate the provision prohibiting the penalization and prosecution of a person based on pregnancy outcomes. Mo. Const. Art. I, §§ 36.3, 36.5. Consistent with this Court’s analysis above, the laws are presumptively invalid under Article I, Section 36.3. Because Defendants have not demonstrated a compelling governmental interest achieved by the least restrictive means justifying these statutory provisions, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ success on the merits is likely. As set out above, the threat of irreparable harm is apparent here as well. Parties do not articulate, and this Court does not find, that issuance of this injunction would inflict harm and injury on other interested parties. The Court also finds that the public interest, as illustrated by the majority who voted to pass Amendment 3, is on the side of granting this injunction. Therefore, the Court finds that Sections 188.056, 188.057, 188.058, and 188.375 shall be enjoined.

c. Reasons Ban. Section 188.038.2 states,

[n]o person shall perform or induce an abortion on a woman if the person knows that the woman is seeking the abortion solely because of a prenatal diagnosis, test, or screening indicating Down Syndrome or the potential of Down Syndrome in an unborn child. 188.038.2 RSMo.

Section 188.038.3 states, “[n]o person shall perform or induce an abortion on a woman if the person knows that the woman is seeking the abortion solely because of the sex or race of the unborn child.” 188.038.3 RSMo. Any physician or other person “who performs or induces or

attempts to perform or induce an abortion prohibited by [Section 188.038] shall be subject to all applicable civil penalties under this chapter including, but not limited to, sections 188.065 [license revocation] and 188.085 [civil liability for medical malpractice].” § 188.038.4 RSMo. Section 188.052 contains a related provision which requires the physician who performed or induced the abortion to complete an individual abortion report that certifies that physician does not have knowledge that the person seeking an abortion is doing so solely because one of the reasons stated in § 188.038. § 188.052.1 RSMo.; 19 CSR 10-15.010(1).

Consistent with this Court’s analysis above, the laws are presumptively invalid under Article I, Section 36.3. Because Defendants have demonstrated no compelling governmental interest achieved by the least restrictive means justifying these statutory provisions, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ success on the merits is likely. As above, the threat of irreparable harm is apparent here as well. Parties do not articulate and this Court does not find that issuance of this injunction would inflict harm and injury on other interested parties. The Court also finds that the public interest, as illustrated by the majority who voted to pass Amendment 3, is on the side of granting this injunction. Therefore, the Court finds that § 188.038 and reporting requirements provided in § 188.052 and 19 CSR § 10-15.010(1) shall be enjoined.

2. Missouri’s Abortion Facility Licensing Requirements: §§ 197.200-.235, 334.100.2(27) RSMo. and all of its implementing regulations; 19 C.S.R. §§ 30-30.050 –.070, 20 C.S.R. § 2150-7.140(2)(V).

Sections 197.200 to 197.235<sup>5</sup> and 334.100.2(27), 19 CSR 30-30.050-.070, and 20 CSR § 2150-7.140(2)(V) contain a number of requirements specifically directed at abortion facilities and ambulatory surgical centers, as those terms are defined by § 197.200. For example, § 192.205 requires abortion facilities to have a license to operate issued by the Missouri Department of Health

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<sup>5</sup> With exception of 197.215.1(2) which is discussed in the Hospital Relationship Requirements.

and Senior Services (“DHSS”) and § 192.210 requires an annual license fee of \$200.00. Section 197.225 authorizes DHHS to “adopt separate rules, regulations or standards to apply to ambulatory surgical centers and to apply to abortion facilities” and requires abortion facilities “to maintain a written protocol for managing medical emergencies and the transfer of patients requiring further emergency care to a hospital within a reasonable distance from the abortion facility.” § 197.225.2-.3 RSMo. The language in these statutes pertain to the actual licensure of the facilities rather than the rights of individuals seeking reproductive care. As they pertain to abortion facilities, the Court finds there may be a compelling governmental interest in licensing abortion facilities in this manner, and at the preliminary injunction phase, Plaintiffs have not shown the probability of success on the merits under *Gabbert*. Therefore, the Court denies the request to enjoin this set of statutes and regulations with the exception of § 197.215.1(2), as discussed below.

3. Missouri’s Hospital Relationship Restrictions: §§ 188.080, 188.027.1(1)(e), 197.215.1(2) RSMo.; 19 C.S.R. § 30-30.060(1)(C)(4).

This category of laws requires physicians providing abortions to have admitting privileges at hospitals that offer obstetric or gynecological care within thirty miles or fifteen-minutes travel time to the health center where they provide any abortion. A written transfer agreement with a nearby hospital is one option for complying with some, but not all, of these requirements. Section 188.080<sup>6</sup> makes it a class A misdemeanor for any physician performing or inducing an abortion to not have clinical privileges as set forth in these laws. This admitting privileges requirement and geographical limitations clearly “...den[y], interfer[e] with, dela[y], or otherwise restric[t]” reproductive freedom and since there was no evidence shown that these laws are “for the limited purpose and ha[ve] the limited effect of improving or maintaining the health of a person seeking

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<sup>6</sup> The analysis in this section only pertains to the language of § 188.080 requiring a physician’s clinical privileges within 30 miles from the location of the abortion facility. The analysis of the statutory requirement permitting only physicians to perform abortions is discussed in the section labeled Missouri’s Advanced Practice Clinician Ban.

care, consistent with widely accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and [do] not infringe on that person’s autonomous decision-making,” no compelling governmental interest exists. Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.3. Nor was it shown that these statutes are the “least restrictive means.” *Id.* The Court finds Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, as the threat of irreparable harm has already been established as provided above, and balancing potential harm to other interested parties with the public interest also weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor as this Amendment was passed by a majority vote. For all of the foregoing, §§ 188.080 (limited as provided in footnote 7), 188.027.1(1)(e), 197.215.1(2), as well as 19 C.S.R. § 30-30.060(1)(C)(4) shall be enjoined.

4. Missouri’s Medication Abortion Complication Plan Requirement: § 188.021.2 RSMo.; 19 C.S.R. § 30-30.061.

Pursuant to § 188.021.2, before providing medication abortion, providers must have a DHSS-approved complication plan. This plan requires medication abortion providers to have a written contract with a board-certified or board-eligible Ob-Gyn (or Ob-Gyn group) who has agreed to be “on-call and available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week” to “[p]ersonally treat all complications” from medication abortion “except in any case where doing so would not be in accordance with the standard of care, or in any case where it would be in the patient’s best interest for a different physician to treat her.” 19 C.S.R. § 30-30.061. Plaintiffs argue it is difficult to find physicians willing to agree to the required responsibilities and some facilities are not able to comply. The Court finds the language of § 188.021.2 does not necessarily deny, interfere with, delay or otherwise restrict reproductive freedom, but it is the language in the regulations that have this specific requirement that do deny, interfere with, delay or otherwise restrict reproductive freedom without the necessary showing that such restriction has the limited purpose and effect of improving or maintaining the health of the person seeking care. For example, a person who travels three hours to get a medication abortion and then returns home, would not benefit from this

requirement. If complications arise after taking the medication, the individual would need to seek emergency care at the nearest hospital emergency room, as with any other medical emergency. Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success as to the regulations only, and considering all of the other factors for granting a preliminary injunction, 19 C.S.R. § 30-30.061, as it pertains to the complication plan, is enjoined.

5. Missouri's Pathology Requirements: § 188.047 RSMo.; 19 C.S.R. §§ 10-15.030, 19 C.S.R. 30-30.060(5)(B).

Missouri law requires that “[a]ll tissue . . . removed at the time of abortion shall be submitted within five days to a board-eligible or certified pathologist for gross and histopathological examination.” § 188.047 RSMo. The pathologist is then required to file a “tissue report” with DHSS and provide a copy of the report to the health center that provided the abortion. *Id.*; see also 19 C.S.R. § 10-15.030, 19 C.S.R. § 30-30.060(5)(B). Plaintiffs stipulate for the purposes of the preliminary injunction hearing that they have not attempted to contact any pathologists in Missouri about the Pathology Requirements since at least 2022, and state that they are currently “unaware of any pathologists in Missouri who are willing to contract with them to provide such an examination and report.” Plaintiffs’ Suggestions in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction or, in the Alternative, Temporary Restraining Order at 37 (citing *Wales Aff.* ¶ 30; *Muniz Aff.* ¶ 31). State Defendants argue that these laws further patient health because it helps detect incomplete abortions, however, pathology of pregnancy tissue after an abortion cannot determine whether the abortion is complete or incomplete. Plaintiffs’ Reply Suggestions in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction or, In the Alternative, Temporary Restraining Order, and Suggestions in Opposition to State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 42 (citing *Grossman Aff.* ¶ 112). These pathology requirements “den[y], interfer[e] with, dela[y], or otherwise restric[t]” reproductive freedom and there was no evidence provided that these laws are

“for the limited purpose and ha[ve] the limited effect of improving or maintaining the health of a person seeking care, [are] consistent with widely accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and [do] not infringe on that person’s autonomous decision-making” to support the government’s purported compelling interest. Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.3. Nor was it shown that this statute and regulations are the “least restrictive means.” *Id.* The Court finds Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm has already been established as provided in the above, and balancing potential harm to other interested parties and the public interest also weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor as this Amendment was passed by a majority vote. Therefore, § 188.047 and 19 C.S.R §§ 10-15.030 and 30-30.060(5)(B) shall be enjoined.

6. Missouri’s Abortion-Specific Informed Consent Laws: §§ 188.027, 188.033, 188.039, RSMo.<sup>7</sup>

Plaintiffs challenge §§ 188.027, 188.033, and 188.039, which the Court will refer to as Missouri’s Abortion-Specific Informed Consent Laws. Pursuant to these statutes, before a patient obtains an abortion, they must receive certain state-mandated information and materials that Plaintiffs argue are biased and meant to stigmatize patients’ decision to obtain an abortion. As an example, § 188.027.1(2) requires individuals be presented with “...printed materials provided by [DHHS], which describe the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments from conception to full term, including color photographs or images of the developing unborn child at two-week gestational increments.” 188.027.1(2)

RSMo. That section further requires,

[s]uch descriptions shall include information about brain and heart functions, the presence of external members and internal organs during the applicable stages of development and information on when the unborn child is viable. The printed material shall prominently display the following statement: “The life of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate the life of a separate, unique, living human being.” § 188.027.1(2) RSMo.

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<sup>7</sup> Plaintiffs collectively refer to these as the “Biased Information Law.”



Section 188.027 is a long statute and intertwines many of the other laws Plaintiffs seek to enjoin such as the 72-hour waiting period that is discussed in the next section. Section 188.033 requires the same information be provided to individuals who are considering obtaining an abortion outside of the state. Under the “likelihood of success” prong of the preliminary injunction standard, Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to succeed because there was no evidence that any compelling governmental interest was achieved in the “least restrictive means” as required by Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.3. The threat of irreparable harm has already been established as provided above, and balancing potential harm to other interested parties with the public interest also weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor as this Amendment was passed by a majority vote. Therefore, § 188.027 and § 188.033 shall be enjoined.

Section 188.039 primarily addresses the 72-hour waiting period that the Court will address in the section below. However, the language in § 188.039.4 pertains to informed consent, specifically, that a person must sign and give their “informed consent freely and without coercion” after discussing “...the indicators and contraindicators, and risk factors, including any physical, physiological or situational factors.” § 188.039.4. RSMo. The Court finds for this purpose, the general laws of informed consent for any medical treatment and procedure are sufficient and that Plaintiffs have shown they are likely to succeed on the merits. There was no evidence that any compelling governmental interest was achieved by the “least restrictive means” as required by Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.3. The threat of irreparable harm has already been established as provided above, and balancing potential harm to other interested parties with the public interest also weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor as this Amendment was passed by a majority vote. Therefore, § 188.039.4, solely as it pertains to this special informed consent requirement, shall be enjoined.

7. Missouri's Waiting Period, In-Person, and Same Physician Requirements: §§ 188.027, 188.039, RSMo.

Sections 188.027 and 188.039 require abortion patients to make two in-person visits to see the same physician, at least 72 hours apart. If the 72-hour waiting period is enjoined, the law specifies that a 24-hour waiting period is to take its place. §§ 188.027.12, 188.039.7 RSMo. At the patient's first appointment, the physician is required to provide the patient with the information described in the preceding section. State Defendants do not contest that these requirements delay patients' access to abortion care by at least 72 hours (or, in the alternative, 24 hours). A mandatory waiting period clearly "den[ies], interfere[s] with, delay[s], or otherwise restrict[s]" reproductive freedom and since there was no evidence presented that these laws are "for the limited purpose and ha[ve] the limited effect of improving or maintaining the health of a person seeking care, consistent with widely accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and [do] not infringe on that person's autonomous decision-making," there is no compelling governmental interest. Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.3. Nor was there any evidence to explain why a waiting period of 72 hours, or in the alternative 24 hours, is the "least restrictive means" in carrying out any purported government interest. *Id.* The Court finds Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm has already been established, and balancing potential harm to other interested parties with the public interest also weigh in Plaintiffs' favor, as this Amendment was passed by a majority vote. Therefore, the provisions in Sections 188.027 and 188.039 pertaining to the waiting period shall be enjoined.

As for the In-Person requirement, State Defendants argue that an in-person appointment is necessary because only an in-person appointment can confirm gestational age for purposes of appropriate use of the abortion pill (which the FDA has approved for the first ten weeks of a pregnancy) and to rule out an ectopic pregnancy. The Court finds Plaintiffs have not met their

burden on the likelihood of success on the merits as to the In-Person requirement and there may be a compelling governmental interest and therefore, denies the request to enjoin this requirement.

Similarly, State Defendants argue the Same Physician requirement is necessary to establish continuity of care. Plaintiffs argue that this creates scheduling issues. The Court notes these alleged scheduling issues occur in conjunction with the 72-hour waiting period. Therefore, absent the 72-hour waiting period, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not met their burden to prove their likelihood of success on the merits as it pertains to this requirement, and denies the request to enjoin the Same Physician requirement at this point.

8. Missouri's Telemedicine Ban: § 188.021 RSMo.

Plaintiffs challenge § 188.021,<sup>8</sup> which states, in part,

[w]hen RU-486 (mifepristone) or any drug or chemical is used for the purpose of inducing an abortion, the initial dose of the drug or chemical shall be administered in the same room and in the physical presence of the physician who prescribed, dispensed, or otherwise provided the drug or chemical to the patient. § 188.021.1 RSMo.

Plaintiffs refer to this as the “Telemedicine Ban.” While this language would prohibit a telehealth appointment, it also requires the physician to be physically present in the room while a patient is taking the medication versus a physician prescribing the medication after an in-person appointment and the patient subsequently taking the medication at home or even in the abortion facility in the presence of a nurse or other medical professional. The language of this portion of the statute “...den[ies], interfere[s] with, delay[s], or otherwise restrict[s]” reproductive freedom and there was no evidence that this law is “for the limited purpose and has the limited effect of improving or maintaining the health of a person seeking care, is consistent with widely accepted clinical standards of practice and evidence-based medicine, and does not infringe on that person’s

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<sup>8</sup> Plaintiffs cite to §188.021 in its entirety in this portion of the argument, but only 188.021.1 has language that could be interpreted to be a ban of “telehealth” appointments.

autonomous decision-making” to establish a compelling governmental interest. Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.3. Nor was it shown that this statute is the “least restrictive means.” *Id.* The Court finds Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm has already been established as provided above, and balancing potential harm to other interested parties with the public interest also weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor as this Amendment was passed by a majority vote. Therefore, § 188.021.1 shall be enjoined.

9. Missouri’s Advance Practice Clinician Ban: §§ 188.020, 188.080, 334.245, 334.735.3 RSMo.

Missouri law requires abortions to be performed by physicians only, rather than physician’s assistants (“PAs”) and Advanced Practice Registered Nurses (“APRNs”), collectively known as Advanced Practice Clinicians (“APCs”). *See* §§ 188.020, 188.080, 334.245, 334.735.3 RSMo. Plaintiffs argue that if APCs were allowed to perform abortions, it would increase their ability to provide care and that APCs are just as qualified as physicians to provide many forms of abortion care. There are many forms of abortion care, making this facial challenge by Plaintiffs a difficult one at this stage of litigation because there may be a compelling governmental interest to allow only physicians to perform some kinds of abortion care. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met the standard required for issuance of preliminary injunction on this point, and it is denied.

10. Criminal Penalties for Abortion Providers: §§ 188.017.2, 188.030.3, 188.056.1, 188.057.01, 188.058.1, 188.075, 188.080, 188.375.3, 197.235, 334.245, 574.200.2 RSMo.

Article I, § 36.5 states:

No person shall be **penalized, prosecuted, or otherwise subjected to adverse action** based on their actual, potential, perceived, or alleged pregnancy outcomes, including but not limited to miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion. **Nor shall any person assisting a person in exercising their right to reproductive freedom** with that person’s consent **be penalized, prosecuted, or otherwise subjected to adverse action** for doing so.

(Emphasis added.)

Several of these statutes have already been discussed in the preceding sections. Specifically, the Court has already found §§ 188.017, 188.056, 188.057, 188.058, 188.375, shall be enjoined, and as such it is appropriate that their respective criminal penalties will also be enjoined at this time pursuant to Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.5.

Sections 197.235 and 334.245 were also previously discussed and were not enjoined, and their respective criminal penalties shall not be enjoined at this time.

Section 188.080 was previously discussed and only the language regarding physicians' admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the abortion facility was enjoined. The requirement of having only physicians perform abortions was not enjoined. As such, the criminal penalties will apply only to the portion of that statute that is not enjoined pursuant to Mo. Const. Art. I, § 36.5.

Plaintiffs include §§ 188.030.3 and 574.200.2 in this category of laws, but do not provide any argument regarding these specific provisions. Therefore, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have not met their burden for a preliminary injunction as to these two statutes.

### **BOND**

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 92.02(d) requires Plaintiffs to execute a bond. Plaintiffs requests a bond of \$100.00. No objection was made by Defendants. The Court finds bond set at \$100.00 is appropriate.

### **CONCLUSION**

For all of the foregoing, it is, therefore

**ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that Plaintiffs shall file a bond in the amount of \$100.00.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that this matter shall be set for a Case Management Conference at a date and time to be determined by the parties and the Court.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that any and all other relief not specifically granted herein is hereby DENIED.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

December 20, 2024

Date

  
HON. JERRI J. ZHANG  
Judge, Division 3

CC: All counsel via e-Notification