STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appelle,

-v-

MSC No._____
COA No._____
LC No._____

EDWIN LARMAR LANGSTON.
Defendant-Appellant.
_____/

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR
Attorney for Plaintff-Appellee

Mr. Mack Tiggart, #147662
Self Represented

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE WITH APPENDIX

IN SUPPORT OF EDWIN L. LAMGSTON

PROOF OF SERVICE

BY:
Mr. Mack Tiggart, #147662
Self Represented
Muskegon Corr. Facility
2400 South Seridan Drive
Muskegon, MI 49442

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Self Represented has taken an interest in the order of March 28, 2025, in People v. Langston, Michigan Supreme Docket No. 163963 pertaining to question number six in its order. Amicus self represented is not an lawyer nor dose he have any formal training or education in the law and procedure as a qualified attorney whom has passed the bar.

Amicus Self Represented only have the minim understanding of the law but can do some legal research, legal writing, and comprehend court ruling. Amicus self represent is only allowed two hours per day, two days a week that I'm allow access to the prison law library, and only use the materials in the library.

Amicus self represented request that this Court hold him to less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003); Hahn v. State Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 715 (6th Cir. 1999).

MCR 7.312(H)(2) permits Self Represented to file an amicus curiae brief without motion for leave from the Michigan Supreme Court.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Mack Tiggart, is self represented listed as an other person invited to file a brief amicus curiae in the court's ruling of March 28, 2025, in People v. Langston, Michigan Supreme Court Docket No. 163968. Amicus self represented will be drawing the court's attention to question number six with remedies as to: What remedy is required if any defendants' sentences of mandatory life imprisonment without parole are found invalid. The remedies that are provide are stated below:

REMEDIES:

(1). Any defendants that's sentence to mandatory like imprisonment without parole are found invalid he/she are eligible for immediately release.

(2). Defendants that has been incarcerated for more than 30 years or more are eligible for immediately release.

(3). Reduce all felony murder convictions to second-degree murder, and remand for resentencing.

(4). Those defendants that was incarcerated with a mandatory life imprisonment without parole in the 80s, 90s, and 2000s was give an MDOC Security Classification Screen - Review (SCSR) that provided each inmate an earliest release date of 30 years for a life sentence. Those individuals had an expectation of going home after 30 years according to the MDOC's SCSR. Those inmates that fails under the old system of the SCSR should be eligible for immediately release.

(5). Any defendants that was offer a plea, for example: 25-50 years for second degree murder and, went to trial and were found guilty of felony murder. Vacate the felony murder reinstate the plea of 25-50 of second-degree murder. If the defendant she/he have served more than the plea offer he/she is eligible for immediately release.

(6). If a defendant was found guilty of felony murder, and was not offer a plea to second degree murder vacate the felony murder resentence the defendants she/he to second-degree murder to a paroleable life sentence. If the defendants have served more than 30 years she/he release must comes swiftly.

Upon the courts final ruling in Mr. Langston, case any defendant(s) if convicted of felony murder those defendants must serve a mandatory sentence of 25-30 years for second-degree murder. If the Court determined that a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without parole are found invaild.

ARGUMENT.

THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IS TO PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A REMEDY/OR REMEDIES TO QUESTION NUMBER SIX IN THE COURT'S ORDER OF MARCH 28, 2025, WHICH STATED: WHAT REMEDY IS REQUIRED IF ANY DEFENDANTS SENTENCES OF MANDATORY LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE ARE FOUND INVALID?

REMEDIES:

(1). Any defendants that's sentence to mandatory life imprisonment without parole are found invalid he/she are eligible for immediately release,

(2). Defendants that has been incarceration for than 30 years or more are eligible for immediately release;

(3). Reduce all felony murder convictions to second-degree murder, and remand for resentencing;

(4). Those defendants that was incarcerated with a mandatory life imprisonment without parole in the 80s, 90s and early 2000s was give an MDOC Security Classification Screen - Review (SCSR), that provided each inmate an earliest release date of 30 years for a life sentence. Those individuals had an expectation of going home after 30 years according to the MDOC's SCSR. Those individuals that falls under the old system of the SCSR must be eligible for immediately release;

(5). Any defendants that was offer a plea, for example: 25-50 years for second-degree murder and, went to trial and were found guilty of felony murder. Vacate the felony murder reinstate the plea of 25-50 of second-degree murder. If the defendants have served more than the plea offer he/she is eligible for immediately release;

(6). If a defendant was found guilty of felony murder, and was not offer a plea to second-degree murder vacate the felony murder resentence the defendants she/he to second-degree murder to a paroleable life sentence. If the defendants have served more than 30 years she/he release must comes swiftly. and;

(7). Upon the courts final ruling in Mr. Langston, case any defendant(s) if convicted of felony murder those defendants must serve a a mandatory sentence of 25-30 years for second-degree murder. If the Court determined that a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without parole are found invalid.

In the Michigan Supreme Court order dated March 28, 2025, SC: No. 163968 in question number six the Court is seeking a remedy states: What remedy is required if any defendants sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without parole are found invalid? See **(Appendix A)**. Ammicus's self represented has made a suggested list of seven different remedies stated above for this Court

should pick one so trial court judges know how to implement the ruling of this Court.

Remedy, number four stated above speaks volume. Those men who came to prison in the early 80s-2000s had an expectation of going hone after 30 years which was consider as a life sentence according to the then MDOC security classification screen - review (SCSR). See **(Appendix B)** Those inmates are left with an illsionary concept of going home after they have served 30 years. Now these men will **"DIE!** in prison before that happen. This Court have the **"AUTHORITY"** to issue a Writ of Mandamus to order the MDOC all inmates that's still alive to honor the old SCSR start the process of releasing those men immediately.

Amicus self represented learned the death of Mr. Mario Streele on November 28, 2024, while in prison. He was 66 years old and had been incarcerated since 1978. He was 20 years old at the time of his offense and did, in fact die in prison. Amicus believes that death in prison sentence for any felony murder, pre-post-Aaron, are cruel or unusual punishment given the differing levels of culpability and the racial disparity for elderly, mostly Black men.

Let' look at **invalid.** Invalid is an adj. Without legal force; legally ineffective or enforceable; void. Also invalid as applied and invalid on its face **(BOTH UNCONSTITUTONAL.).** See Random House Webster's Dictionary of the Law.

Amicus goes on to say. For which reason all oppression which may happen to spring from any branch of the sovereign power must necessary be out of the reach of any stated rule or express legal provision; but if ever they unfortunately happen, the prudence of the times must provide **new remedies** upon new emergencies. See Blackstone Commentary 1 BL. Comm 121.

Mr. Langston is a good example of mandatory life imprisonment without

parole are found invalid. People v. Langston, 86 Mich. App. 656, 660 (1978). Following the Aaron's ruling which is unconstitutional and cruel and/or unusual punishment under Const. 1863, art 1. § 16 or U.S. Const. Am VIII.

In People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court "ABROHATED" a common law felony murder doctrine allowing for any slaying in the course of one of the statutorily enumerated felonies to be first-degree murder an justifying imposition a life sentence. The Aaron Court began its analysis noting that the felony murder doctrine was ill defined at common law and of "questionable origin." Id. at 698. After tracking the doctrine's English common law roots where it was abolished in 1957, the Court surveyed the legal landscape of common law murder, as it existed in 1980.

Great Britain has abolished felony-murder liability by statute. Michigan has abolished felony-murder liability under its common law, id citing Aaron, 409 Mich. at 727-729, Hawaii and Kentucky have abolished felony-murder liability by statute. See news article of Charles Grodin WRONG PLACE. (Appendix C). The Model Penal Code also has abandoned the traditional doctrine of felony-murder.

Mr. Langston, have served 50 years and continual to served a sentence on an uncunconstitutional statute MCL MCL 750.316 that been "Abrogated.

The Supreme Court then framed the issue to be resolved by Aaron stated:

> The question we addressed today is whether Michigan recognizes the felony-murder doctrine and accordingly, the category of malice arising from the underlying felony. The relevant inquiry is first whether Michigan has a statutory felony murder doctrine. If it dose not, it must then be determined whether Michigan has or should have a common law felony murder doctrine. 409 Mich. at 177.

The Supreme Court found that Michigan has no statutory felony murder doctrine that "designates as murder any death occurring in the course of a felony without regard to whether it was the result of accident, negligence,

recklessness of willfulness. Rather, Michigan has a statute that makes a murder occurring in the course of one of the numerated felonies a first degree murder." Id. at 177. In fact, Michigan is the 'ONLY STATE' that's occupying two first degree murders, Premeditated murder MCL 750.316, and first degree felony murder MCL 750.316 occupying the same statute **(MCL 750.316)**, which is unconstitutional. Each charge(s) must come under its own statute independently. I do not believe this issue has never been brought to any Court's attention.

No law exits under Const. 1963 art 3 § 7 authorizes any court with the authority to "Abrogate" common law, the Supreme Court then abolished the assumed common law rule that intent to commit the underlying enumerated felony satisfied the mental element for first-degree murder. 409 Mich. at 177.

In sum, Aaron found that a doctrine of "questionable origin" one for which there was no logical or practical basis for existence of modern law" had been unjustly used to elevate punishment to life imprisonment in numerous cases. 409 Mich. at 689, 731. Aaron found no basis for the doctrine in either statute or in case law. 409 Mich. at 717, 721-722. Aaron found that an "assumption by appellate decisions that the doctrine existed" resulted in the need to **abolish** the doctrine under the authority of Const. 1963, art 3 §7. 409 Mich. at 723,731. The Court then held that such **abolishment** would have only prospective effect. 409 Mich. at 734.

McDougall v. Schanz, 461 Mich. 15, 30 (1999), make astoundingly clear is that prior Supreme Court ruling in which the result is a matter of substantive law, in purpose and effect, violates separation of power and must be invalidated as such. People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335 (2002), People v. Glass, 464 Mich. 266 (2001). The key question to ask when determining if a particular ruling should be declared under McDougall v. Schanz, are: **(1)** Is

the result of the ruling in purpose or effect a matter of substantive law? and if so (2) what was the source of authority for the Court's ruling?

The first question must be answered in the affirmative. Aaron did not address purely procedural matter, but substantive law, i.e., defining crimes and setting punishment. Defining the mental elements of an offense and fixing punishment for transgressions is not a judicial function, but a legislative function, not judicial. See People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335 (2002), Aaron 409 Mich. 729 n 119. Defense preclusion doctrine are best left to the discretion of the legislature. 409 Mich. 709 n 97; cf People v. Capenter, 464 Mich. 223 (2001).

It is clear that Aaron, is a ruling that results in or effects substantive law, not merely procedural matters. It is equally evidence that absent a legal foundation Aaron runs afoul of Mcougall supra, and must be invalidated as unlawful instruction into Legislative matter. It is not wisdom, but Authority that make law" Thomas Hobbers, Dialogue of the Common Laws (1670). This bring us to the second question under McDougall, What was the legal foundation for the exercise of authority for the ruling in Aaron? Law, in Michigan, has three sources: (1) Constitutions, (2) Statute and, (3) Common law.

Of these three sources of authority, constitutional authority is paramount as it is penultimate expression of the citizenry standing outside of and above all agencies of government.' " In order to avoid in validation under McDougall, the Aaron ruling must have legal foundation in one of these sources.

Aaron itself notes that there was no authority for a felony murder doctrine in either the murder statute or its own case law. Finding no authority for a doctrine concerned to be a common law assumption, the Court turned to the Constitution as its source of authority. 409 Mich. at 722. The felony murder doctrine has been classified as being of "questionable origin and a

clear doctrine of common law " in the time of Sir. Edward Coke. People v. Stevenscn, 416, 383 (1982), Such a "common law" with such harsh consequences can only be deeded repugnant.

The inaccurate version of MCL 750.316 was adopted by the trial and appellate courts of Michigan, which was contrived by many of the courts due to perceived necessity. The courts and prosecutors of the state believed all defendants charged with felony murder to be abhorrent but could not find the malice unless it was convarted from the underlying felony, one of the crime's elements.

Rather, than settle for a conviction of the lesser-included offenses, the prosecutor argued for an unfound view of the statue and the judges appeased them by so instructing to the affect of something, which had not been passed by the Legislature.

Thus, the resulting trial and appellate decisions in the case at bar failed to adhere to the Legislative scheme and were aptly looked at it as fiction rather, lies to test proceedings so fundamentally lawless that imprisonment from them is not merely erroneous but void. See Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391 (1963).

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, I, Amicus Self Represented, Mack Tiggart, pray that this Court Abolish the first-degree felony murder deem it to be unconstitutional by occupying the same statue (750.316), as first-premeditated murder. Or in the alternative issue a writ of mandamus ordering the MDOC to reinstate its old Security Classification Screen - Review, to dose inmates that it apply to with immediately release if they have passed their outdate or if they are still alive.

Respectfully Submitted,

BY: Mr. Mack Tiggart

Mr. Mack Tiggart, #142862
Self Represented
Muskegon Corr. Facility
2400 S. Sheridan Drive
Muskegon, MI 49442

Dated 4-8, 2025

Appendix A

People v. Langston

Supreme Court of Michigan

March 28, 2025, Decided

SC: 163968

Reporter
2025 Mich. LEXIS 530 *

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v EDWIN LAMAR LANGSTON, Defendant-Appellant.

Prior History: **[*1]** COA: 358537. Van Buren CC: 76-002701-FC.

Core Terms

malice, supplemental brief, mandatory, parole, order of the court, unusual punishment, life imprisonment, amicus curiae, felony murder, sentence, parties, cases, cruel

Judges: Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice. Brian K. Zahra, Richard H. Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Kimberly A. Thomas, Justices. THOMAS, J., not participating because of her prior involvement in this case.

Opinion

Order

By order of January 31, 2025, the parties were directed to file supplemental briefs. On order of the Court, the supplemental briefs having been received, the application for leave to appeal the December 2, 2021 order of the Court of Appeals is again considered, and it is GRANTED. The time allowed for oral argument shall be 20 minutes for each side. *MCR 7.314(B)(1)*. The parties shall address: (1) whether *People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980)*, correctly limited its application to prospective-only relief; (2) whether, in the absence of evidence that the defendant acted with malice, mandatory life without parole for felony murder constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment under *Const 1963, art 1, § 16* or *U.S. Const, Am VIII*; (3) whether *People v Hall, 396 Mich 650; 242 N.W.2d 377 (1976)*, should be overruled; (4) whether a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for felony murder is cruel and/or unusual punishment under *Const 1963, art 1, § 16* or *U.S. Const, Am VIII*, in all cases decided before *Aaron, supra*, where the jury was not required to make a finding of malice, or only in those pre-*Aaron* **[*2]** cases where overwhelming evidence of malice was not otherwise presented at trial; (5) if the latter, the standard by which the courts should determine whether sufficient evidence of malice was presented and the means by which a defendant should present such an argument; and (6) what remedy is required if any defendants' sentences of mandatory life imprisonment without parole are found invalid.

Amici who have appeared in this case are invited to file supplemental briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

THOMAS, J., not participating because of her prior involvement in this case.

243-8

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SCREEN - REVIEW

4835-3481
CSJ-481 10/88

Prisoner Name (last, first)	Prisoner Number	Date Entered on CMIS
TIGART, MACK	B 147662	9-11-91
Date	**Institution**	**Screened By**
9-11-91	SMT	W. Hawk, RM III

CONFINEMENT LEVEL

EARLIEST RELEASE: Date = month 12 year 2019
Term = years 30 months 0

CONF. LEVEL

1. Any escape attempt or conspiracy to escape secure adult custody in last 5 years?
   [X] no [ ] yes → V
2. Two such escape incidents or any involving hostages or violence in last 10 years?
   [X] no [ ] yes →
3. Is prisoner within 6 years of ERD, or if not has served more than one-third ERD term?
   [ ] yes [X] no → IV
4. Does prisoner have a record of predatory homosexual behavior in an institutional setting?
   [ ] no [ ] yes →
5. Is prisoner serving or pending service on escape sentence or had a non-CRP adult walkaway in last 5 years?
   [ ] no [ ] yes →
6. Are there 3 or more instances of escape/absconding/walkaway/AWOL in last 10 years?
   [ ] no [ ] yes →
7. Is prisoner within 3 yrs of ERD, or within 4, with 2 years served?
   [ ] yes [ ] no → II
8. Is there a juvenile arrest record as well as a walkaway from juvenile or non-CRP adult facility in last 10 years?
   [ ] no [ ] yes →
9. Is prisoner VH (or first year and potential VH assault risk), without a definite parole or discharge date within next year?
   [ ] no [ ] yes →
10. Is prisoner serving a life sentence?
    [ ] no [X] yes →
11. Major pending felony charges?
    [ ] yes [ ] no → I

CONFINEMENT LEVEL [1] IV

MANAGEMENT LEVEL

Management Score at last screening Dated 8/10/90 was (A) 8 — Enter Points

SINCE THAT DATE

1. Number of acts resulting in separate major misconducts = 0
2. Number of those which were non-bondable or resulted in felony conviction X2= 0
3. Number of those involving serious injury X2= 0
4. Has assault risk increased to V.H. =4= 0
5. Classified one or more times to involuntary segregation =4= 0
6. Found guilty of homicide, rioting, striking or inciting riot or strike =10= 0

SUBTOTAL, Unfavorable Behavior (B) 0

7. Number of six month periods completed without any major misconducts or invol. seg. or convictions
   Date of the periods: 8/90 - 8/91 X3= 6
8. Number of six month periods completed with satisfactory work/school performance. Date of the periods: 4/91 - X2= 0
9. Reached age 26 since last screening =2= 0
10. Completed G.E.D. or earned vocational certificate or college degree. =1= 0

SUBTOTAL, Favorable Behavior (C) 6

TOTAL CHANGES (Indicate plus or minus) (B-C=D) — (D) 6

NEW SCORE (A+D=E) (E) 2
(If minus enter zero) Range 0-35

0-6 Level I; 7-10 Level II; 11-14 Level III; 15-22 Level IV; 23-35 Level V

NEW MANAGEMENT LEVEL [2] I

TRUE SECURITY LEVEL

1. Cross out the lower of the two levels above
2. If you agree that the remaining box correctly identifies this prisoner's true security needs, enter that level again here: [3] III
   (If not, enter here the level which does, and the reason for the difference) _____

Two Level Difference Requires C.O. Approval APPROVED BY _____ DATE _____

TRUE SECURITY LEVEL

ACTUAL PLACEMENT LEVEL

If there is a placement available at the prisoner's true security level enter that level here: [4]
(If not, enter level where prisoner will be placed and reason for the difference) _____

Two Level Difference Requires C.O. Approval APPROVED BY _____ DATE _____

ACTUAL PLACEMENT LEVEL

DISTRIBUTION: White - Record Office; Canary - Central Office; Pink - Counselor; Goldenrod - Prisoner

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SCREEN – Review – Male Prisoners Only

4835-3481
CSJ-481 8/02

Prisoner Name (last, first)	Prisoner Number	Institution	Date Entered on CMIS
Tiggart, MACK	147662	NRF	3/7/03 ema
Date	**Purpose of Screen**	**Screened By**	**Supervisor Review**
3/5/03	RAVIEW	L. GAUSE	C. Powell, Lvm

CONFINEMENT LEVEL

EARLIEST RELEASE DATE = month 12 year 2019

TERM = years 30 months _____

1. Any escape attempt or conspiracy to escape secure adult custody in last five years?
   [X] No [ ] Yes →
2. Two such escape incidents or any involving hostages or violence in last 10 years?
   [X] No [ ] Yes →
3. Is prisoner currently designated a STG II?
   [X] No [ ] Yes →
4. Is prisoner currently designated as a Homosexual Predator?
   [X] No [ ] Yes →
5. Is prisoner within 6 years ERD, or if not has served more than one-quarter his term?
   [X] Yes [ ] No →
6. Is prisoner serving or pending service on escape sentence or had a DOC adult walkaway in last 5 years?
   [X] No [ ] Yes →
7. Is prisoner serving a life sentence or designated as a STG I?
   [ ] No [X] Yes →
8. Is prisoner VH (or first year and potential VH assault risk), without a definite parole within next year?
   [ ] No [ ] Yes →
9. Are there three or more instances of escape/absconding walkaway/AWOL in last 10 years?
   [ ] No [ ] Yes →
10. Is there a juvenile arrest record as well as a walkaway from juvenile or non-DOC adult facility in last 10 years?
    [ ] No [ ] Yes →
11. Is prisoner within 3 yrs of ERD, or within 4, with 2 served?
    [ ] Yes [ ] No →
12. Major pending felony charge or deportation hearing/detainer?
    [ ] Yes →

CONFINEMENT LEVEL: 1 II [ ] No →

CONF. LEVEL: V / IV / II / I

MANAGEMENT LEVEL

Management Score at Last Screening Dated: 2/1/02 was (A) 0 — Enter Points

SINCE THAT DATE:

1. Number of acts resulting in separate major misconducts	=	0
2. Number of those which were non-bondable or resulted in felony conviction	x 2 =	0
3. Number of those involving serious injury	x 2 =	0
4. Has assault risk increased to V.H.	= 4 =	0
5. Classified one or more times to administrative segregation	= 4 =	0
6. Found guilty of homicide, rioting, striking or inciting riot or strike	= 10 =	0
SUBTOTAL, Unfavorable Behavior	(B)	0
7. Number of six month periods completed without any major misconducts or administrative segregation or convictions. Date of the periods: 11/23/01 - 5/23/02 = 3; 9/24/02 - 11/24/02 = 1; BANK 11/25/02	x 6 =	9
8. Number of six month periods completed with satisfactory work/school performance. Date of the periods: 9/6/01 - 3/6/02 = 2; 3/7/02 - 9/7/02 = 3	x 3 =	5
9. Reached age 26 since last screening.	x 2 =	0
10. Completed G.E.D. or earned vocational certificate.	= 1 =	0
SUBTOTAL, Favorable Behavior:	(C)	14
TOTAL CHANGES (Indicate plus or minus) (B-C=D):	(D)	-14
NEW SCORE (A+D=E):	(E)	-14
(If minus enter zero) Range 0-35:		0

NEW MANAGEMENT LEVEL

0-6 Level I; 7-10 Level II; 11-14 Level III; 15-22 Level IV; 23-35 Level V:

2 I

TRUE SECURITY LEVEL

1. Cross out the lower of the two levels above
2. If you agree that the remaining box correctly identifies this prisoner's true security needs, enter that level again here: (If not, enter here the level which does, and the reason for the departure.) _____

3 II

Appropriate Signature is required: APPROVED BY C Powell DATE 3/6/03

ACTUAL PLACEMENT LEVEL

If there is a placement available at the prisoner's true security level, enter that level here: (If not, enter the level available, and the reason for the waiver.) _____

4 II

Appropriate Signature is required: APPROVED BY _____ DATE 3/6/03

Appendix C



SCOPE

WRONG PLACE,

Hein, now 32, was in prison at 18.

BY CHARLES GRODIN

IN 1995 GENE HEIN APPEARED ON MY CNBC show to talk about his 18-year-old son, who was serving a life sentence with no chance of parole—even though he hadn't killed or robbed anyone. What had Brandon Hein done?

On May 22 of that year, in Agoura Hills, Calif., Brandon and three friends went to buy marijuana from two boys operating out of a backyard fort; Brandon and his friends were drunk. An argument ensued, and one of the friends wound up stabbing one of the boys from the fort, who bled to death.

At trial, the prosecution didn't claim that Brandon had killed anyone. But it did convince a jury that he and his friends had intended to commit robbery, even though most of the boys knew each other, no one wore disguises, and nothing was stolen. According to the felony-murder rule, all participants in a felony can be held equally culpable, including those who did no harm, possessed no weapon, and didn't intend to hurt anyone. Brandon got the same punishment as the boy who committed the murder. (One explanation: the murdered boy's dad was a police officer, and after the Simpson acquittal and the hung jury in the Menendez case—both of which occurred in the same judicial venue—the prosecution desperately wanted a conviction.)

As the years have gone by, I've become friends with Brandon's father, mother, and stepmother. I've tried to get elected officials to take up Brandon's cause, but I've had little luck—no one wants to look soft on crime. A few months ago I met with Attorney General Eric Holder. He was sympathetic but promised nothing.

Brandon is now 32. Earlier this year, after he'd served 14 years, his sentence was commuted to 29 years to life with a chance of parole. In California, one must serve 85 percent of a sentence before becoming parole-eligible. That means Brandon must serve more than 24½ years before being considered—another decade. Among Western nations, only the U.S. retains the felony-murder rule, though Michigan, Kentucky, and Hawaii have dropped it. It's a disgrace—and if the Obama administration is talking about reforming drug-sentencing laws, it should consider abolishing the felony-murder rule on the grounds of cruel and unusual punishment.

The felony-murder rule is a disgrace; the Obama administration should consider abolishing it.

Gene told me once that, back in 1995, when they got to court, Brandon's attorney told Gene, "The prosecution may ask for the death penalty." This is a boy who, at 18, got drunk and got into a fight, and he'll be 42 before he gets a chance to reclaim his life.

GRODIN *was cited by former governor George Pataki for helping reform New York's Rockefeller drug laws.*

STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appelle,

-v-

MSC No._____
COA No._____
LC No._____

EDWIN LARMAR LANGSTON.
Defendant-Appellant.
_____/

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR
Attorney for Plaintff-Appellee

Mr. Mack Tiggart, #147662
Self Represented

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Mack Tiggart, #147662 states, that on the date stated herein is a true copy of the foregoing pleadings are: Brief Amicus Curiae, Appendix A-C. And Proof of Service. Said documents has been served upon the Wayne Country Prosecutor Office, and the the Michigan Supreme Court by way of Disbursement Authorization [EXPEDITED LEGAL-MAIL-PRISONER], pursuant to MCR 8.105(C) and MCR 2.107(D).

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 2025.

Mack Tiggart

April 8, 2025

Mr. Mack Tiggart, #147662
Muskegon Corr. Facility
2400 S. Sheridan Dr.
Muskegon, MI 49442

Clerk of the Court
Michigan Supreme Court
P.O. Box 30052
Lansing, MI 48909

RE: Permission to File Brief Amicus Curiae

Dear clerk:

I, **MACK TIGGART**, #147662, self represented move the Court for permission to file a brief amicus curiae regarding the case of People v. Langston, 2025 Mich. Lexis 530, (in the order of March 28, 2025); on question number six in accordance with MCR 7.312(E).

Enclosed, for your filing is three copies of the brief amicus curiae for your filing. And one copy to the Wayne County Prosecutor Office.

Thank you for your time and professionalism in this matter.

Sincerely,

Mr. Mack Tiggart

Mr. Mack Tiggart /s/

cc:

Clerk
Wayne County Prosecutor
file