

Exhibit 1

**STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE SUPREME COURT**

**MICHIGAN SENATE and MICHIGAN
SENATE MAJORITY LEADER
WINNIE BRINKS**, in her official capacity,

Supreme Court Case No. 169381

Court of Appeals Case No. 374786

Plaintiffs-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants,

Court of Claims Case No. 25-000014-MB

v.

**MICHIGAN HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, MICHIGAN
HOUSE SPEAKER MATT HALL**, in his
official capacity, and **MICHIGAN HOUSE
CLERK SCOTT STARR**, in his official
capacity,

Defendants-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,

and

**MICHIGAN HOUSE SPEAKER MATT
HALL**, in his official capacity.

Defendant.

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

American Financial Services Association (“AFSA”) adopts the statement of jurisdiction offered by the Michigan House of Representatives.

STATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED

Should the Court grant leave to appeal to correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous decision requiring the Michigan House of Representatives to present to the Governor nine bills passed by the prior Legislature?

I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF INTEREST¹

The American Financial Services Association (“AFSA”) is the primary national trade group for the U.S. consumer credit industry. AFSA’s members include banks and non-bank lenders that provide consumers with access to credit through traditional installment loans, direct and indirect vehicle financing, mortgages, and payment cards. AFSA members include national banks and non-bank state licensed financial institutions that have a significant Michigan footprint and provide approximately \$20 billion in credit to Michigan consumers annually. As part of its mission, AFSA promotes ethical lending to informed borrowers and advocates to protect consumers’ access to credit.

AFSA appears as amicus in support of the Michigan House of Representative’s application for leave to appeal. Among the nine bills from the 2023-2024 legislative session that the previous House of Representatives failed to present to the Governor is House Bill 4900 of 2023. House Bill 4900 is a wholesale reform of the state’s collection laws. It amends fourteen sections of the Revised Judicature Act and adds to it eleven new sections of law. If enacted, House Bill 4900 would have major ramifications for AFSA and its members in Michigan in terms of both compliance and business impact. Among other things, House Bill 4900 changes the process and amount that may be garnished from a person’s wages and bank accounts, places new requirements on financial institutions that receive a writ a garnishment for account holders, alters the type and amount of assets exempt from sale and levy under an execution, and prescribes certain forms and notices that must be developed by the State Court Administrative Office.

¹ This brief was not authored by counsel for a party to this case in whole or in part, nor did such counsel or a party make a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. MCR 7.312(H)(3). No person other than AFSA, its members, or its counsel made any monetary contribution to author this brief. *Id.*

If uncorrected, the Court of Appeals’ decision creates a system in which those most affected by proposed legislation will face newfound unpredictability regarding the life of bills and legislative business. As illustrated here, that means bringing to life bills approved by the last Legislature—even though that Legislature ceased to exist over one year ago when it was replaced by a new Legislature following the 2024 elections. But the 1963 Constitution prohibits a previous Legislature from entrenching its unfinished business in the affairs of a subsequently elected Legislature—whether that prior Legislature was replaced one year prior or decades earlier. That prohibition is found in article 4, § 13, and supported by the 1961 Convention Record and the federal precedent upon which the Michigan Constitution is based. When a Legislature ends in an even numbered year (because a general election is held), the old Legislature’s business dies. To find otherwise, as the Court of Appeals did, leads to an undemocratic result where the business of past Legislatures can suddenly resurface on the verge of enactment without the notice and predictability that the Michigan Constitution affords the public.

In the alternative, the Court of Appeals also erred by finding that article 4, § 33 imposes a constitutional duty on the House to present the nine bills at issue. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of Claims nor the Senate in its briefing have attempted to explain the meaning of the last four words of that provision’s first clause: “Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor *before it becomes law ...*” (emphasis added). When read as a whole, § 33 merely provides a guardrail to ensure that no bill becomes a law without the Governor having an opportunity to veto. Whether the nine bills in this case should become law is simply not at issue. The power of presenting bills to the Governor is entirely within the Legislature’s authority and determined by its own procedural rules. The constitutional text and convention record (including

a critical passage the Court of Appeals relied on) shows exactly that. Respectfully, this Court should avoid entering disputes regarding the enforcement of legislative rules.

This case raises critical constitutional questions that will affect the relations of Michigan's three branches of government for years to come. The Court of Appeals' decision has upset the balance between those government powers and denied AFSA and its members the stability in lawmaking to which they are entitled. The House's application should be granted, and the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

AFSA relies on the House's statement of the pertinent background facts and the proceedings below.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

AFSA adopts the House's statement of the applicable standard of review.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. **The Court of Appeals' decision unconstitutionally carries over legislative business from one Legislature to the next and undermines the 1963 Constitution's democratic goals.**

Under the Court of Appeals' ruling, bills passed by the House and Senate can be presented for the Governor's consideration at an indefinite future date—well after the election and formation of a new Legislature. But that is incorrect. In furtherance of democratic interests, Michigan's Constitution does not allow legislative proceedings, including the uncompleted presentment of bills, to be indeterminately held over. Instead, to provide citizens with notice and predictability of legal changes and to protect the democratic interest in electing new representatives, the Michigan Constitution—in accord with federal practice—requires the termination of an old Legislature's business.

1. The Michigan Constitution prevents legislative proceedings from carrying over to a newly elected Legislature.

At the Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1961, delegates considered whether legislative proceedings should carry over to a subsequent legislative session. The delegates ultimately adopted the language of article 4, § 13, which states in part that “[a]ny business, bill or joint resolution pending at the final adjournment *of a regular session held in an odd numbered year shall carry over* with the same status *to the next regular session.*” (Emphasis added). Put simply, the only time that legislative business can carry over to the next regular session is from odd numbered years when there is no intervening general election to form a new Legislature.² Conversely, at the end of the two-year term in an even-numbered year, during which a new Legislature is elected—no legislative business, bills, or resolutions may carry over to the next Legislature.

That language was a change from the 1908 Constitution that mandated, regardless of whether a session was held in an odd or even numbered year, that “[n]o motion, bill or resolution pending in one session of any term shall carry over into a later regular session.” Const 1908, art 4, § 13. The Convention’s Committee on Legislative Powers recommended such a modification and clarified that it did intend to allow legislative proceedings to be carried over from one session to another, but only during *the same* Legislature (i.e., from a session ending in an odd numbered year to a session beginning in an even numbered year): “The committee recommends that bills or joint resolutions pending during the first session of a particular legislature can be carried over *to the*

² This is apparent when reading article 4, § 13 in connection with article 2, § 5, which provides for the time of general elections: “[A]ll elections for national, state, county and township offices shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November *in each even-numbered year* or on such other date as members of the congress of the United States are regularly elected.” (Emphasis added).

second session of the same legislature.” 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2373 (emphasis added).

The Constitution of 1963 does not allow for a newly elected Legislature to pick up and act upon any bills, resolutions, or business that its predecessors left unfinished. Instead, “[a]t the end of the session prior to an election, bills and resolutions should die, since there is a new legislature and business should not be carried from one legislature to the next.” *Id.* As further explained, “the new language permits bills or joint resolutions *pending during the first session of a particular legislature* to be carried over *to the second session of the same legislature.*” Address to the People, at 31. (Emphasis added). For good reason, the Constitution of 1963 continued the practice of barring a Legislature from acting upon business left pending at the end of a prior Legislature.³

The requirement that a new Legislature must start with a clean slate is further supported by the delegates’ reliance on federal precedent. See 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2374 (explaining revision to article 4, § 13 and stating “[t]hat’s exactly what we are doing—following the federal practice.”) The congressional precedent does not include a carve out that would keep bills alive into the start of a future Congress for the purpose of presentment. It

³ There may be a handful of historical examples of bills that were not presented until after the subsequent Legislature convened. But such instances do change the fact that this Court “has not only the authority, but also the primary responsibility of interpreting and enforcing our Constitution.” *Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency*, 509 Mich 673, 692; 983 NW2d 855 (2022).

That this Court need not acquiesce to past unconstitutional practices is further supported by the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in *INS v Chadha*, 462 US 919 (1983). There, the Court was not persuaded by Congress’ historical practice: “[t]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statute.”

instead provides that all business and proceedings of one Congress end at the start of a new Congress. Specifically, “business remaining at the end of one Congress does not, however, carry over to the beginning of a new Congress, since Congress does not allow the past proceedings of one Congress to bind its successor.”⁴ Deschler’s Precedents, chapter 1, § 11, at 70. And further, “[e]ach Congress is a separate parliamentary body that comes into being at assembly and terminates upon *sine die* adjournment. ... [B]usiness of one Congress does not continue as business of the next Congress. For example, bills and resolutions introduced in one Congress cannot be taken up in a subsequent Congress but must be formally reintroduced. Unfinished business pending at the close of one Congress does not remain unfinished business of a subsequent Congress.” Precedents of the House, volume 1, chapter 1, § 8, p 100.

⁴ Importantly, the principle that a Legislature cannot bind a future Legislature applies to more than just the amendment or repeal of statutes. That is apparent in the congressional precedent highlighted above, but also in *Peterson Financial LLC v City of Kentwood*, 988 NW2d 746 (Mem) (2023) (J. Viviano concurring). As Justice Viviano explained, “[t]here is a principle of constitutional law that ‘one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors. ... When cashed out in terms of constitutional doctrine, ... the principle means that legislatures may not enact entrenching statutes *or entrenching rules*: statutes *or rules* that bind the exercise of legislative power, by a subsequent legislature ...’” *Id.* at 747-48 (emphasis added), citing Posner & Vermeule, *Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal*, 111 Yale L J 1665, 1665 (2002). In addition, the principle “also applies to contractual arrangements that barter away the legislative body’s authority to exercise its power in the future.” *Id.* at 748 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

In that sense, a rigid application of the doctrine to only statutes, as the Court of Appeals found, misses the mark. COA Opinion, at 9. Far more important is the purpose behind the principle, which “reflects democratic sentiments. It ‘is meant to ensure that each government can be democratically responsive to its own electorate and is not bound by the preferences of the past.’” *Id.*, quoting Posner & Vermeule, at p 881).

Critically, neither the Constitutional language, the convention record, nor the federal precedent makes an exception to sustain bills that a prior Legislature failed to present before it was replaced by virtue of an election.⁵

2. Requiring each Legislature to begin anew serves the democratic interest.

By preventing bills, resolutions, and business from being taken up by a future Legislature, the Michigan Constitution provides temporal limits on a Legislature’s authority consistent with democratic representation. “Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which” legislative accountability can be achieved. The Federalist Papers, No. 52, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). Accordingly, each “election furnishes the electorate with an opportunity to provide new direction for its representatives.” Julian N. Eule, *Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity*, 1987 American Bar Foundation Research Journal, 379, 404-05. “The voters do not delegate authority to rewrite history. ... Each set of elected officials ought to be viewed as endowed by their sovereign mandate to make policy choices *only within a bracketed temporal zone*. Just as delegation of authority *does not encompass incursions into the domain of legislatures yet to come*, it does not contemplate contravening the sanctity of the past. ... [T]he choices of our representatives can be relied on *for the temporal realm in which these agents legitimately exercised authority*. No more is guaranteed, but no less is

⁵ When, for example, the sitting House of Representatives receives a bill that has passed both chambers, it has an obvious incentive to ensure the bill is presented—a majority of its members previously approved the bill because it reflected their policy preferences.

The failure of that House to present before the next Legislature convenes would understandably frustrate and perplex proponents of that legislation. But that does not mean the only remedy available to those supporters is to have the House’s successor take up old, unfinished business. The remedy for such a problem is straightforward and based in democratic representation: ensure the House takes its final step in pursuit of its policy goals and timely presents the bill to the Governor before the newly elected Legislature convenes.

tolerable.” *Romein v General Motors Corp*, 436 Mich 515, 545; 462 NW2d 555 (1990) (J. Brinkley concurring), quoting Eule, at 441-446 (emphasis added).

The practical effects of such principles were on the minds of the members of the 1961 Constitutional Convention’s Legislative Powers Committee. When considering the proposed change to art 4, § 13 to allow “business, bills and resolutions” to carry over, the committee consulted with then-Lieutenant Governor T. John Lesinski. According to the Committee’s meeting minutes, Lieutenant Governor Lesinski cautioned against carrying over unfinished business, explaining that the public has a “need [for] stability and to know what to anticipate...” December 5, 1961 Meeting Minutes, at 2-3. The end of a Legislature and re-introduction of bills strengthens democracy since “new legislation causes great public interest...” And that democratic outcome is undermined by allowing unenacted bills to persist well into the term of a subsequently elected Legislature since it becomes easier “to get some undesirable legislation through after the notoriety dies down if bills [are] held over ...” *Id.*

While the 1963 Constitution amended the process to allow bills, resolutions, and other business to be carried over to new sessions of the same Legislature, it also continued the practice of ensuring a clean break between the end of an old Legislature and the beginning of a new one. In doing so, it codified the limited temporal authority of one Legislature and strengthened the democratic process by ensuring all authority extends from the people and their right to elect representatives. See *Mothering Justice v Attorney General*, 515 Mich 328, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024), slip op at 14 n 10 (“The democracy principle is a helpful tool to analyze our laws—especially those statutes and constitutional provisions that implicate elections and direct democracy ... ‘[D]emocracy’ itself is core to our Constitution and must inform the lens we use to interpret laws.”).

3. The Court of Appeals' decision creates instability by holding over bills for potential enactment well into the terms of future Legislatures.

Despite the 1963 Constitution's requirement that legislative proceedings terminate at the end of a session in an even numbered year when a new Legislature is elected, the Court of Appeals' decision would keep alive the nine bills at issue in this case. That means bills voted on over a year ago by legislators who were not re-elected in 2024 must be presented to the Governor by the current Legislature (which includes members who could not have voted on the bills because they did not take office until 2025) at an undetermined date and potentially signed into law. The Constitution simply does not tolerate bills or business of a prior Legislature lying dormant only to spring back to life potentially years later—whether because of the whims of a new Legislature or the result of a lawsuit. It instead furthers the aims of democracy by preventing legislative entrenchment and requiring a new Legislature to start fresh and follow the entire lawmaking process outlined in the Constitution. Such legislative guardrails ensure notice and predictability for those most affected by legislative changes.

If business could extend into future Legislatures, it would bolster opportunities for political mischief. For instance, consider a House and Senate under same party control serving alongside a Governor of another party. Under such a scenario, the Legislature could simply pass bills that the Governor opposes and will not sign, keep those bills alive, and wait to present them at an opportune time after a new Governor with more agreeable policy preferences is elected. And the House or Senate could do so even though new members had since been elected and a newly aligned majority had taken control of the other legislative chamber. In effect, that means bills that were long ago debated (perhaps by legislators no longer in office) and removed from public scrutiny could suddenly re-emerge on the cusp of enactment.

Such abrupt legislative action would undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of various provisions of article 4 of the state Constitution that bring transparency to legislative action. As this Court has explained, “[a] long history underscores an intent to” among other things, “provide notice to the public of legislation under consideration irrespective of merit.” *Anderson v Oakland County Clerk*, 419 Mich 313, 329; 353 NW 2d 448 (1984). For example, article 4, § 26 requires that “every bill shall be read three times in each house before the final passage thereof.” But what good does that provision do if those readings occurred long ago in a past Legislature? Numerous constitutional guardrails depend on that transparency provision being honored. Article 4, § 25 prohibits any law from being “revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only” and requires that “[t]he section or sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.” Why require amended sections of law to be published and re-enacted if a bill can be brought back to life and presented to the Governor long after the public has forgotten it exists—and long after it was read by a prior Legislature? And Article 4, § 24, requires that a bill contain only a single object that must be stated in its title to ensure “legislators and the public have proper notice of legislative content and to prevent deceit and subterfuge.” *Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 P.A. 294*, 389 Mich 441, 464; 208 NW2d 469 (1973). Allowing legislative business to linger into subsequent Legislatures will only enhance opportunities for deceit and subterfuge, not prevent them.

Nor would eventual presentment bring clarity to those most affected by the proposed legislation. As Judge Murray explained at the Court of Appeals, confusion regarding the nine bills at issue will only increase if they are eventually presented to the Governor:

[I]f on remand the trial court orders the *current* legislature to present the at-issue bills passed by a *prior* legislature, does that mean that the current Legislature can override any veto of that legislation, which again, was passed by a different Legislature? Or even more

fundamentally, can the Governor exercise her constitutional veto power? Because, under § 33, a veto needs to be done during the session of the prior Legislature. . . . And, with respect to the pocket veto, § 33 states that if the Governor ‘does not approve, and the legislature has *within that time* finally adjourned the session at which the bill was passed, it shall not become law. Const 1963, art 4, § 33 (emphasis added). ‘Within that time,’ of course, means the 14 days since presentment, which if presentment is ordered to occur now, it would be occurring well *after* the prior Legislature adjourned, not ‘within that time.’ Again, because this constitutional time has passed, it is questionable whether the Governor has the power to veto or to pocket veto these bills under § 33. [Murray COA Opinion, at 4-5].

The weight of such confusion would fall on the public, specifically those like AFSA and its members who stand to be significantly impacted as major legislative changes hang in the balance. What is the legal status of bills presented to the Governor when, because those bills were processed over a year ago by a past Legislature, the Constitution arguably forecloses all the Governor’s options but approval? Even if these bills are ordered to be presented in the future, can citizens genuinely exercise their democratic right to petition the Governor to veto or approve the legislation if her hands are tied? If the Governor attempts to veto or pocket veto any of these nine bills, might they still become law?

The Court can avoid these difficult questions if it corrects the mistake of the Court of Appeals. Judge Murray’s discussion of the relevant text of article IV, § 33 shows that it too codifies a rule against one Legislature leaving its bills to be presented by its successor: “[It] seems apparent that the people themselves have created a deadline for legislative presentment, . . . which is no later than 11:59 a.m. on the second Wednesday of January of odd-numbered years.” And that means the “time for presentment is long past...” *Id.*

B. Presentment is within the prerogative of the Legislature and determined by legislative rules.

In the alternative, even if passed bills could be kept alive into the sessions of future Legislatures, article IV, § 33 does not contain a constitutional duty to present passed bills to the Governor. Neither the Senate nor any court below has construed the import and meaning of the last four words of the first clause of article IV, § 33: “Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor *before it becomes law ...*” (emphasis added). Textually, to hold as the Court of Appeals did—that this clause as a whole flatly imposes a duty on the Legislature to present to the Governor all passed bills—would render those four words meaningless. This provision merely (but explicitly) protects the Governor’s right to ensure that a bill does not become a law before she has a formal opportunity to exercise the veto power. That is apparent in *Wood*, where this Court held that the house where a bill originated could not prevent the return of a veto by temporary adjournment because to hold that such a bill “*becomes a law* would abridge the executive power of veto.” *Wood v State Admin Bd*, 255 Mich 220, 230; 238 NW 16 (1931) (emphasis added). There is of course no claim in this case that any of the nine bills have become law.

Equally critical is article 4, § 33’s silence regarding the presentment process, which it leaves entirely to the Legislature. The Court of Appeals turned to the constitutional convention debates and relied on the following remarks of one delegate:

What happens is this: let us assume that we have a senate bill, a bill originally introduced into the senate. It passes the senate and it passes the house and presumably in a different form. Then the 2 houses have to agree to it in a conference, but it finally is adopted by both houses in a particular form. Then, it being a senate bill, *it becomes the duty of the secretary of the senate to print that bill in the form in which it was finally adopted and it is the duty of the secretary of the senate, since it was a senate bill, to present that bill to the governor.* Sometimes a bill can be speedily printed, sometimes it takes 2 or 3 weeks to get a bill printed, if it’s a great big thick bill

and there's an awful lot of other bills also to be printed. [1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1719; COA Opinion, at 9 (emphasis added)].

But the delegate was not discussing a *constitutional* duty. Instead, he was simply summarizing “what happens” under the process for printing and presentment according to the Legislature’s internal process spelled out in its rules. Indeed, when asked a follow-up question, that same delegate clarified that he was discussing only procedural and not constitutional requirements: “I know so intimately *how this process works procedurally*. The secretary of the senate or the clerk of the house, as the case may be, delivers to the governor’s office this enrolled bill and accepts a receipt from the governor’s office, ...” 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1720 (emphasis added).

The delegate was merely summarizing legislative rules. That is evidenced by the Constitution’s omission of any mention of a Secretary of the Senate or Clerk of the House of Representative. Those offices exist only because they were created by rules of the Legislature. That means that if the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House has a duty to present bills, it is a duty imposed by legislative rule alone and not the Constitution. As House Rule 20 of the 2023-2024 Session provided, “[w]hen a House bill has been finally passed by the two houses, the Clerk shall present to the Governor an enrolled copy thereof, taking a receipt showing the day, hour and minute at which such copy was deposited in the executive office.” See HR 1 of 2023, at 11; see also 2023 Journal of the House, 26-30 (No. 1, January 11, 2023), Joint Rule 16 (“Every bill passed . . . by both houses and returned to the house of origin shall forthwith be enrolled and signed by the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Enrolled bills shall be presented to the Governor...”)

As the Constitution makes plain, “[e]ach house, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall choose its own officers and determine the rules of its proceedings . . .” and “[n]o

person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Const 1963, art 4, § 16; art III, § 2. “A general challenge to the governing procedures in the House of Representatives is not appropriate for judicial review.” *Hammel v Speaker of the House of Representatives*, 297 Mich App 641, 647; 825 NW2d 616 (2012), citing *Straus v Governor*, 459 Mich 526, 531; 592 NW2d 53 (1999). In addition to not imposing a requirement to present bills, article 4, § 33, is entirely silent regarding who must present bills, how they must be presented, and when. Such silence leaves the issue of presentment entirely to the Legislature. And here, the Court of Appeals erred by enforcing a duty that does not come from the 1963 Constitution but is found only in the legislative rules.

In sum, article 4, § 33’s initial clause simply ensures that no bill *becomes law* unless it is first presented to the Governor. Here, no party is claiming that the bills at issue should become law without first presenting them to the Governor. The lack of specific constitutional requirements and the convention record demonstrate that presentment is—and has long been—within the Legislature’s exclusive authority. The Court of Appeals erred when it interfered with that internal legislative process and ordered that the House had a constitutional duty to present the nine bills at issue.

V. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

The House of Representatives’ application should be granted, and the Court of Appeals’ decision should be reversed. The ruling below erred by unconstitutionally requiring the current Legislature to present bills to the Governor that were passed by the prior Legislature. Those bills and all business of the old Legislature died when the new Legislature was convened. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals also erred by finding that article 4, § 33 of the 1963 Constitution imposes a duty on the Legislature to present all passed bills. To the extent such a duty exists, it comes only from legislative rules, which respectfully this Court should not seek to enforce.

Dated: January 20, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief complies with the word limitation of MCR 7.212(B)(1), as incorporated by MCR 7.305(F) and MCR 7.312. The brief contains 4,858 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by MCR 7.212(B)(2).

Dated: January 20, 2026

/s/ Cole V. Lussier
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