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IN THE CHANCERY COURT FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
TWENTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, DAVIDSON COUNTY

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE TENNESSEE STATE CONFERENCE, et al.,	)	
Petitioners,	)	
v.	)	**Case No. 26-0591-II**
THE STATE OF TENNESSEE GOVERNOR, et al.,	)	**Chancellor Anne C. Martin** **Chancellor Tony Childress** **Judge James Gass**
Respondents.	)	

FINAL ORDER

Petitioners seek relief from three of the four bills enacted during the 2026 Extraordinary Session, specifically HB 7001 (changes to candidate qualification and residency requirements and voter notice changes for the 2026 Congressional Elections), HB 7002 (repeal of prohibition on redistricting between censuses), and HB 7003 (congressional redistricting). *See generally* Am. Emergency Pet. for Decl'y J. & Inj. Relief, ¶¶ 13–51, May 12, 2026 [hereinafter "Am. Pet."];[1] Am. Pet., at 19–20, ¶¶ B–I. They seek a declaration that HB 7001 and HB 7002 violated Article III, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution and that HB 7003 violated state law. Am. Pet., at 19–20, ¶¶ B–H. They also seek to enjoin Respondents from enforcing any of these laws. Am. Pet., at 20, ¶ I.

The Proclamation that called the General Assembly into special session stated as follows:

> NOW THEREFORE, I, Bill Lee, Governor of the State of Tennessee, by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by Article III, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, do hereby call the One Hundred Fourteenth General Assembly of the State of Tennessee to meet and convene in extraordinary session

[1] By agreement with Respondents, Petitioners amended their Amended Petition to cure a deficiency in the prayer for relief with respect to two of the Petitioners. As such, we do not address Respondents' argument with respect to the prayer for relief, and the Second Amended Petition has no bearing on any of the other issues before us.

> at the Capitol in Nashville on May 5, 2026, at 2:00 p.m., Central Time, to consider and act upon legislation relative to: (1) the composition of Tennessee's congressional districts; (2) making statutory changes that are necessary to effectuate changes to the composition of Tennessee's congressional districts and to facilitate 2026 congressional elections; (3) making appropriations sufficient to provide funding for any legislation that receives final passage during the extraordinary session or other appropriations sufficient to facilitate 2026 congressional elections; and (4) making appropriations sufficient to pay the expenses of the extraordinary session, including the expenses of carrying out any actions taken pursuant to this proclamation.

Bill Lee, State of Tennessee, *Proclamation by the Governor*, at 1, May 1, 2026. The challenged statutes produced from that special session are as follows:

> Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 2-16-102, is amended by deleting the last sentence of the section.

2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, Second Extraordinary Session, ch. 1, § 1 (HB 7002).

> SECTION 1. Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 2, Chapter 16, is amended by designating the chapter as part 1 and adding the following new part 2:
>
> **Part 2**
>
> **2026 Congressional Elections**
>
> **2-16-201. Definitions.**
>
> As used in this part, "2026 primary or general election" means the primary or general election held in 2026 for a congressional district office of the house of representatives in the United States congress.
>
> **2-16-202. Application of part.**
>
> This part applies to the 2026 primary or general election if the general assembly revises by law the composition of one (1) or more congressional districts in this state after the qualifying deadline under § 2-5-101 for the 2026 primary or general election.
>
> **2-16-203. Notice of congressional redistricting.**
>
> (a) Upon the revision of the composition of one (1) or more congressional districts as described in § 2-16-202, the coordinator of elections shall provide notice of the revised congressional districts and the special qualifying deadline prescribed by § 2-16-204 to the qualified candidates at their addresses of record and county election commissions as soon as practicable after the effective date of the revised composition of congressional district boundaries. The coordinator of elections shall publish notice of the revisions to the composition of congressional districts, the qualified candidates, and the special qualifying deadline on the secretary of state's official website.
>
> (b) As soon as practicable after receiving notice from the coordinator of elections pursuant to subsection (a), each county election commission in which all

or any portion of a redrawn congressional district is located shall publish notice on the county election commission's official website, if one exists.

(c) Notwithstanding another law to the contrary, publication of notice under subsection (b) satisfies all notice requirements under this title, including requirements to publish notice of changes to districts, offices to be elected, or qualifying deadlines arising from the redrawn congressional districts.

2-16-204. Congressional redistricting - Special qualifying period.

(a)

(1) Notwithstanding another law to the contrary, an independent or primary candidate who qualified under chapter 5, part 1 of this title for the 2026 primary or general election, as applicable, prior to the effective date of this act is not required to submit a new nominating petition pursuant to subsection (b).

(2) (A) A candidate qualified under subdivision (a)(1) is qualified for election in the redrawn district designated by the same district number, unless the candidate changes districts under subdivision (a)(2)(8) or the candidate timely withdraws under subdivision (a)(2)(C).

(B) A candidate qualified under subdivision (a)(1) who wishes to run in a different district after districts are redrawn shall submit notice in writing to the coordinator of elections in which district the candidate intends to seek nomination for office no later than twelve o'clock (12:00) noon, prevailing time, on May 15, 2026. Such notice must be notarized and may be submitted in person, by mail, or by email with an attached document that includes the candidate's scanned signature. A candidate who does not timely file such notice will remain qualified for the redrawn district designated by the same district number under subdivision (a)(2)(A).

(C) A candidate qualified under subdivision (a)(1) may withdraw from the primary or general election by submitting a notarized statement to the coordinator of elections in person, by mail, or by email with an attached document that includes the candidate’s scanned signature by twelve o’clock (12:00) noon, prevailing time, on May 15, 2026.

(b)

(1) A special qualifying period is established for the 2026 primary or general election. The qualifying deadline under this section is twelve o’clock (12:00) noon, prevailing time, on May 15, 2026.

(2) Nominating petitions must be furnished by the county election commission or coordinator of elections. A nominating petition for the 2026 primary or general election must include at least twenty-five (25) signatures from registered voters residing anywhere within any county that lies wholly or partially within the congressional district.

(3) Each independent or primary candidate shall file the candidate's original nominating petition with the coordinator of elections and a certified duplicate with the chair of the appropriate party’s state executive committee, in the case of primary candidates, by the qualifying deadline. The coordinator of elections shall maintain a copy of the original petition for the state election commission.

(4) The coordinator of elections shall, as soon as practicable after the deadline in subsection (c), certify to the chair of each county election commission the names of each candidate who has qualified under this section to have the candidate's name placed on the ballot for the 2026 primary or general election, as applicable.

(5) A candidate who qualifies during the special qualifying period established pursuant to this subsection (b) is not permitted to withdraw after the qualifying deadline.

(c) If the state executive committee of a political party determines that a candidate who qualifies under this section to run in the 2026 primary or general election is not qualified under the rules of the respective party as a bona fide member of the party, then the committee shall file the committee's determination with the coordinator of elections by email no later than twelve o'clock (12:00) noon, prevailing time, on May 17, 2026. A candidate cannot appeal an adverse decision of a state executive committee under this subsection (c).

2-16-205. Costs incurred by county election commissions.

The chair and secretary of a county election commission shall certify to the secretary of state expenses incurred by the county election commission or its members in the performance of its duties in connection with changes and duties required by this part. Upon receipt of a certification of expenses, the secretary of state shall review the claim, and shall certify to the comptroller of the treasury those expenses that must be reimbursed to the county by this state.

2-16-206. Three-judge panel.

Any civil action arising out of the revision of the composition of one (1) or more congressional districts in this state or arising out of the application of this part shall be heard by a three-judge panel appointed pursuant to title 20, chapter 18.

2-16-207. Repeal of part.

This part is repealed December 31, 2026.

SECTION 2. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 2-13-209, is amended by designating the existing language as subsection (a) and adding the following as a new subsection (b):

(b) This section does not apply to the 2026 primary election for the office of United States representative.

2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, Second Extraordinary Session, ch. 2, §§ 1–2 (HB 7001).

SECTION 1. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 2-16-103, is amended by deleting the section and substituting instead the following:

[sets new congressional districts for the U.S. House of Representatives].

2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, Second Extraordinary Session, ch. 3, § 1 (HB 7003).

This matter came before the Court[2] for a hearing on Petitioners' Motion for Temporary Injunction. *See* Order, at *1–2, May 12, 2026. At the hearing, however, the parties stipulated that no facts in the record were in dispute and by agreement wished to proceed as a final hearing on the merits for a declaration and permanent injunction. Therefore, this order constitutes the final order and judgment of the Court in this case.

For the reasons that follow, the Court **FINDS** in favor of Respondents and **ORDERS** this cause to be **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

STANDARDS OF LAW

This cause initially came before the Court upon a Motion for Temporary Injunction under Tennessee Rule of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.04. By agreement of the parties, however, this matter has been converted into a final adjudication on the merits. Therefore, the Court does not consider the temporary injunction factors that the parties initially briefed but instead the merits themselves.

I. Constitutional Challenges

This case is a constitutional challenge to two of the three challenged bills—and a statutory challenge to the third bill—premised upon Article III, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. Tennessee courts are "charge[d] . . . to uphold the constitutionality of a statute wherever possible." *Waters v. Farr*, 291 S.W.3d 873, 882 (Tenn. 2009). When presented with a question of the constitutionality of a statute, the Court must "begin with the presumption that an act of the General Assembly is constitutional" and "indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of the statute's constitutionality." *State v. Pickett*, 211 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting *Gallaher v. Elam*, 104 S.W.3d 455, 569 (Tenn. 2003)); *see also Waters*, 291 S.W.3d at

[2] This Court sits as a three-judge panel duly appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-18-101 and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 54. *See* Corrected Order, No. ADM2021-00775, at *1 (Tenn. May 12, 2026).

917 (Koch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing *Gallaher*, 104 S.W.3d at 459–60; *In re Adoption of E.N.R.*, 42 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Tenn. 2001); *State ex rel. Maner v. Leech*, 588 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tenn. 1979)) ("This presumption places a heavy burden on the person challenging the statute."); *Perry v. Lawrence Cnty. Election Comm'n*, 411 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tenn. 1967) (quoting *Frazer v. Carr*, 360 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1962)); *Bell v. Bank of Nashville*, 7 Tenn. 269 (1823) ("'[T]he Legislature of Tennessee, like the legislature of all other sovereign states, can do all things not prohibited by the Constitution of this State or of the United States.' . . . 'To be invalid a statute must be plainly obnoxious to some constitutional provision.'").

II. Statutory Construction

As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained,

> [w]hen engaging in statutory interpretation, "well-defined precepts" apply. "The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." In construing statutes, Tennessee law provides that courts are to avoid a construction that leads to absurd results. "When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend the meaning of the language . . . ."

Coffman v. Armstrong Int'l, Inc., 615 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tenn. 2021) (citations omitted). Courts are obligated to "avoid constructions that place one statute in conflict with another and endeavor to resolve any possible conflict between statutes to provide for a harmonious operation of the laws." *State v. Frazier*, 558 S.W.3d 145, 153 (Tenn. 2018) (citing *Lovlace v. Copley*, 418 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2013)).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties have stipulated that the record consists of the pleadings and the contemporaneously filed attachments, and that there are no disputes of fact. Accordingly, the Court finds the following as pleaded by the litigants.

Petitioner National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Tennessee State Conference ("NAACP Tennessee") is a local unit of the national, non-profit organization known as the NAACP. As part of NAACP Tennessee's mission, it engages in voter registration drives, voter education, including educating voters about their voting rights, the state's once-a-decade redistricting process, voter's assigned election precincts, candidates, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Registered voters in Tennessee are members of the NAACP.

Petitioner Gloria Sweet-Love is a resident of Haywood County, which is in Tennessee's 8th Congressional District. She is also the President of NAACP Tennessee. In that role, Petitioner Sweet-Love oversees NAACP Tennessee's operations.

Petitioner Jesse Chism is a resident of Shelby County. He is the Representative for Tennessee District 85, and he is the Chair of the Tennessee Black Caucus of State Legislators. Representative Chism has qualified as a candidate in the 2026 election where he is seeking reelection for District 85, and he has begun campaigning for office, expending time and financial resources.

Petitioner Devante Hill is a resident of Shelby County. Prior to the challenged statutes being signed into law, Petitioner Hill resided in Tennessee's 9th Congressional District. Prior to redistricting, Petitioner Hill qualified as a candidate for Tennessee's 9th Congressional District. Prior to redistricting, Petitioner Hill had invested considerable time and resources campaigning in that district. Part of the time and resources spent campaigning in District 9 occurred after the original deadline to qualify as a candidate had passed. Following redistricting, Mr. Hill made the decision to be a candidate for Tennessee's 5th Congressional District. Petitioner Hill does not live in Tennessee's 5th Congressional District. Petitioner Hill had been running a substantial, well-funded campaign to represent the citizens of Tennessee's then-defined 9th Congressional District

where he made investment of resources decisions in reliance on then existing congressional districts and an existing prohibition on mid-census redistricting. *See* Am. Pet. ¶ 45–49. The change in the district lines has now rendered some of those investments pointless.

Respondent Bill Lee is the Governor of the State of Tennessee. Governor Lee is the chief executive of Tennessee. Through a proclamation, Governor Lee called the special session that produced the challenged statutes. Governor Lee signed those statutes into law.

Respondent General Assembly is the legislature of the State of Tennessee. The General Assembly convened in the special session and passed four bills, three of which are challenged here.

Respondent Tre Hargett is the Secretary of State for the State of Tennessee. Respondent Mark Goins is the Coordinator of Elections for the State of Tennessee. Secretary Hargett appointed Mark Goins, the Coordinator of Elections in the State of Tennessee. Coordinator Goins serves as the Tennessee Coordinator of Elections, acts under the authority of the Tennessee Secretary of State, and is charged with obtaining and maintaining "uniformity in the application, operation and interpretation of the election code."

The challenged statutes were signed into law after the original deadlines for candidates to qualify for the 2026 congressional elections had passed. These statutes only affected the configuration of the State's nine congressional districts. They did not affect the configuration of the State's 99 House or 33 Senatorial districts. Parts of Shelby County were in Tennessee Congressional Districts 8 and 9 prior to the enactment of the challenged statute. Parts of Shelby County are now in Tennessee Congressional Districts 5, 8, and 9.

ANALYSIS

I. Sovereign Immunity

The parties agree as to the significance of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution to this case. They disagree, however, as to what that significance is. Petitioners direct the Court to the first sentence of that provision: "That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17. They assert that our Constitution requires this matter to be heard. Respondents, however, point the Court to the second sentence of the same provision: "Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17. Indeed, while Tennessee's courts indisputably recognize the essential nature of our Open Courts Clause, *see Case v. Wilmington Trust, N.A.*, 703 S.W.3d 274, 286–88 (Tenn. 2024), the Tennessee Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, Section 17 as prohibiting suits "against the State unless explicitly authorized by statute" and thereby "upholding the doctrine of sovereign immunity." *Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan*, 263 S.W.3d 827, 849 (Tenn. 2008) (citing *N. British & Mercantile Co. v. Craig*, 62 S.W. 155, 157 (Tenn. 1900); *State v. Bank of Tenn.*, 62 Tenn. (3 Baxt.) 395, 403 (1874)).

In other words, "[t]he sovereign State of Tennessee is immune from lawsuits 'except as it consents to be sued.'" *Smith v. Tenn. Nat'l Guard*, 551 S.W.3d 702, 708 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting *Stewart v. State*, 33 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tenn. 2000)). The Court of Appeals has explained the relation between this doctrine and that of subject matter jurisdiction:

> Subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity are two different legal concepts. However, courts may lack subject matter jurisdiction because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit, which acts as a jurisdictional bar to an action against the state by

> precluding a court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. The doctrine of sovereign immunity divests the courts of subject matter jurisdiction.

Mobley v. State, No. W2017-02356-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 117585, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2019) (quoting *Colonial Pipeline Co.*, 263 S.W.3d at 851; *White v. State ex rel. Armstrong*, No. M1999-00713-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 134601, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2001)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). What this means as a general rule is that the General Assembly must waive sovereign immunity in order for a suit to proceed. *See* Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 17.

Petitioners argue that the State of Tennessee has waived its sovereign immunity for suits against public officials for unconstitutional acts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121. Pet'rs' Reply to Resp'ts' Resp. in Opp'n to Pet'rs' Mot. for Temp. Inj., at 6–7, May 18, 2026 [hereinafter "Reply"]. Notably, Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 has been interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court as "[t]he General Assembly clearly and unmistakably waiv[ing] sovereign immunity" in such cases. *Recipient of Final Expunction Order in McNairy Cnty. Cir. Ct. Case No. 3279 v. Rausch*, 645 S.W.3d 160, 168–69 (Tenn. 2022) ("We hold that section 1-3-121 waives sovereign immunity for causes of action seeking 'declaratory or injunctive relief . . . regarding the legality or constitutionality of a governmental action.'"); Reply, at 6–7. Earlier this year, however, Governor Lee signed a bill into law that repealed Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121. 2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, ch. 664, § 2 (HB 1971). Thus, Petitioners' waiver argument is no longer accurate.

There is an exception, however, to the general rule that the General Assembly must waive sovereign immunity. It applies to state officers who specifically enforce the allegedly unconstitutional law. *See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan*, 263 S.W.3d 827, 849–50 (Tenn. 2008) ("This concept of sovereign immunity generally extends to state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity. . . . however, . . . the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar suits

against state officers to prevent them from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional statute."); *see also Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

Petitioners argue that Governor Lee issued the proclamation that called the General Assembly into special session, and the General Assembly convened that special session and enacted the laws that are now being challenged. Those are both undoubtedly true statements. Neither Governor Lee nor the General Assembly, however, enforce the provisions of HB 7001, HB 7002, and HB 7003, which are state election laws. Nor is Governor Lee's general duty to enforce Tennessee law sufficient for this purpose. *See Tenn. Conf. of NAACP v. Lee*, 746 F. Supp. 3d 473, 509–10 (M.D. Tenn. 2024).

Instead, it is the Secretary of State, through the Coordinator of Elections, who enforces state election laws,[3] as Respondents helpfully pointed out in their Response to the first Petition.

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[3] Respondents additionally argue that sovereign immunity continues to bar Petitioners' claim with respect to "the repeal of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-3-105's notice requirements *by county commissions*." Defs.' Supp. Resp. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Temp. Inj., at 13, May 15, 2026 (emphasis in original); *see* Am. Pet., ¶¶ 29–31; Am. Pet., at 19, ¶ F. That provision previously stated:

> Immediately after any alteration of precinct boundaries or change of district, the county election commission shall publish the changed boundaries in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. The county election commission shall mail to each active voter whose polling place is changed a notice of the voter's new polling place and precinct number. Furthermore, immediately after any alteration of precinct boundaries, the county election commission shall give written notification of such changes to the comptroller of the treasury.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-3-105; *see* 2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, 2d Extraordinary Session, ch. 2, § 1, 2-16-203 (HB 7002) (supersedes the previous law with respect to the 2026 Congressional Elections, *see* 2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, 2d Extraordinary Session, ch. 2, § 1, 2-16-201, -202, by creating the following new provisions: "(b) As soon as practicable after receiving notice from the coordinator of elections pursuant to subsection (a), each county election commission in which all or any portion of a redrawn congressional district is located shall publish notice on the county election commission's official website, if one exists."; "(c) Notwithstanding another law to the contrary, publication of notice under subsection (b) satisfies all notice requirements under this title, including requirements to publish notice of changes to districts, offices to be elected, or qualifying deadlines arising from the redrawn congressional districts."

While the county commissioners do enforce part of this new law, it does nevertheless appear that Coordinator Goins—and through him, Secretary Hargett—plays an essential role in the enforcement of the new provision. *See* 2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, 2d Extraordinary Session, ch. 2, § 1, 2-16-203(a) ("Upon the revision of the composition of one (1) or more congressional districts as described in § 2-16-202, the coordinator of elections shall provide notice of the revised congressional districts and the special qualifying deadline prescribed by § 2-16-204 to the qualified candidates at their addresses of record and county election commissions as soon as practicable after the effective date of the revised composition of congressional district boundaries. The coordinator of elections shall publish notice of the revisions to the composition of congressional districts, the qualified candidates, and the special qualifying deadline on the secretary of state's official website."). As such, the Court is not persuaded by this argument from Respondents.

Defs.' Resp. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order or Temp. Inj. If So Construed, at 7–8, May 8, 2026 [hereinafter "Resp."]. The Tennessee Secretary of State is an independent constitutional officer who does not act at the direction of the Governor. Resp., at 8–9; *see* Tenn. Const. art. III, § 17 ("A Secretary of State shall be appointed by joint vote of the General Assembly and commissioned during the term of four years; he shall keep a fair register of all the official acts and proceedings of the Governor; and shall, when required lay the same, and all papers, minutes and vouchers relative thereto, before the General Assembly; and shall perform such other duties as shall be enjoined by law."); Tenn. Const. art. V, § 4 (emphasis added) ("The Governor, Judges of the Supreme Court, Judges of Inferior Courts, Chancellors, Attorneys for the State, Treasurer, Comptroller and *Secretary of State, shall be liable to impeachment*, whenever they may, in the opinion of the House of Representatives, commit any crime in their official capacity which may require disqualification; *but judgment shall only extend to removal from office, and disqualification to fill any office thereafter*. The party shall, nevertheless, be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law. The Legislature now has, and shall continue to have, power to relieve from the penalties imposed, any person disqualified from holding office by the judgment of a Court of Impeachment.").

Accordingly, the Court holds that sovereign immunity precludes Petitioners' claims against Governor Lee and the General Assembly but that Secretary Hargett and Coordinator Goins fit into the *Colonial Pipeline* exception. Therefore, Petitioners' claims are hereby **DISMISSED** with prejudice as to Governor Lee and the General Assembly.

II. Legislative Immunity

Having no jurisdiction to entertain an action against the General Assembly because that body is shielded here by sovereign immunity, the Court is no longer able to consider whether

legislative immunity—"perhaps the most sweeping and absolute" of "all the immunities enjoyed by government officials," *Mayhew v. Wilder*, 46 S.W.3d 760, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)—likewise shields the General Assembly from suit in this case.

III. Standing

In Tennessee, "the province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract opinions." *Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty.*, 301 S.W.3d 196, 203 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting *State v. Wilson*, 70 Tenn. (2 Lea) 204, 210 (1879)). One doctrine utilized by our courts to ensure the appropriate exercise of judicial power is standing. *See id.* "Courts use the doctrine of standing to determine whether a litigant is entitled to pursue judicial relief as to a particular issue or cause of action." *City of Memphis v. Hargett*, 414 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tenn. 2013) (citing *ACLU of Tenn. V. Darnell*, 195 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tenn. 2006); *Knierim v. Leatherwood*, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1976)). It is "rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy." *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). "Grounded upon 'concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society,' the doctrine of standing precludes courts from adjudicating 'an action at the instance of one whose rights have not been invaded or infringed.'" *Darnell*, 195 S.W.3d at 619–20 (quoting *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); *Mayhew v. Wilder*, 46 S.W.3d 760, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Standing thus presents a threshold issue. *Fisher v. Hargett*, 604 S.W.3d 381, 396 (Tenn. 2020) (citing *City of Memphis*, 414 S.W.3d at 96) ("The question of standing is one that ordinarily precedes a consideration of the merits of a claim.").

The doctrine also directs the court to focus on the party bringing the lawsuit rather than the merits of the claim. *Fisher*, 604 S.W.3d at 396 ("The proper focus of a determination of standing is a party's right to bring a cause of action, and the likelihood of success on the merits does not

factor into such an inquiry."); *see also Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. V. Tenn. Dep't of Educ.*, 645 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tenn. 2022) (quoting *Warth*, 422 U.S. at 500) ("While standing 'often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted,' it 'in no way depends on the merits' of the claim.").

> Our jurisprudence recognizes two categories of standing that govern who may bring a civil cause of action: non-constitutional standing and constitutional standing. Non-constitutional standing focuses on considerations of judicial restraint, such as whether a complaint raises generalized questions more properly addressed by another branch of the government, and questions of statutory interpretation, such as whether a statute designates who may bring a cause of action or creates a limited zone of interests. Constitutional standing, the issue in this case, is one of the "irreducible . . . minimum" requirements that a party must meet in order to present a justiciable controversy.

City of Memphis, 414 S.W.3d at 98 (citations & footnote omitted). Constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to establish three elements:

> 1) a distinct and palpable injury . . . ; 2) a causal connection between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct; and 3) the injury must be capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of the court.

Fisher, 604 S.W.3d at 396 (citing *City of Memphis*, 414 S.W.3d at 97). Here, Respondents challenge all three elements, but we need only address the injury element in full because the analyses of traceability and redressability converge with the analysis of the *Colonial Pipeline* exception to sovereign immunity.[4]

A plaintiff "must have an injury in law to access the courts." *Wilmington Trust*, *N.A.*, 703 S.W.3d at 288 (citing *Barnes v. Kyle*, 306 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1957). This requires "a violation of

[4] Respondents additionally dispute whether Petitioners' alleged injuries have a causal connection to Respondents' conduct and whether those injuries are redressable by a favorable decision from this Court. Like the *Colonial Pipeline* exception to sovereign immunity, the fundamental question to both of those standing elements is whether Respondents specifically enforce the challenged statutes. Because if they do not, then their conduct cannot have any causal connection to the alleged injuries from those statutes. Similarly, if they do not enforce those statutes, then an injunction from this Court ordering Respondents to stop enforcing those statutes is worthless. As the Court has already held that the remaining Respondents enforce the challenged statutes, it also holds that Petitioners have established both traceability and redressability.

his legal rights in some way, or a violation of law that affect[s] him adversely." *Id.* at 287 (quoting *Barnes*, 306 S.W.2d at 3). "In private rights claims, an injury in law is sufficient," but "[i]n public rights claims, there must also be an injury in fact." *Id.* at 291 (citing *Darnell*, 195 S.W.3d at 620; *City of Memphis*, 414 S.W.3d at 98). The reason for this is to ensure that "the judicial branch operates within the judicial power by adjudicating the rights and interests of affected citizens and not entangling itself in political disputes within the province of the other branches of government." *Id.* (citing *Mabry v. Baxter*, 58 Tenn. (11 Heisk.) 682, 690 (1872); *Mengel Box Co. v. Fowlkes*, 186 S.W. 91, 92 (Tenn. 1916)).

Drawing such a distinction raises an obvious question: what is the difference between a private rights case and a public rights case? Unfortunately, the Tennessee Supreme Court has not yet addressed this question head on. *See id.* at 291 n.16 (citation omitted) ("Because the case before us clearly concerns only private rights, we do not attempt to further define public rights or articulate a test distinguishing between public and private rights here beyond what our jurisprudence has already articulated. Further distinction between public and private rights under Tennessee law is better left to a case in which the need for such distinction is presented."). Fortunately, however, the Supreme Court has still left us with enough clarity to move forward. In *Patten v. City of Chattanooga*, 65 S.W. 414, 420 (Tenn. 1901), the Court explained that when state action is injurious "to the common body of citizens. . . . those public rights which are common to all, and to citizenship itself," it is "the duly-elected representatives of the people" with whom the remedy lies because "[c]ourts do not sit to declare abstract propositions of law, or to determine, for any one who may desire to know, whether laws or ordinances are valid" unless a particular citizen "can go further, and show some right which he has aside from those rights which are incident to the mere fact of citizenship, that he may, for himself or in behalf of others similarly

situated, invoke the conceded jurisdiction of the courts." *Id.* Also helpfully, the Court recognized that all of the prior cases in which it utilized the constitutional test for standing involved plaintiffs seeking judicial review of statutes, constitutional amendments, or other legislative or executive acts. *Wilmington Trust, N.A.*, 703 S.W.3d at 290–91. As such, this Court is confident that an applicable case is now before it, and so Petitioners must each demonstrate an injury in fact in addition to their injuries in law, which are the alleged constitutional and statutory infirmities at the hearts of HB 7001, HB 7002, and HB 7003.

> To satisfy the injury in fact requirement, a plaintiff must show an injury that is "distinct and palpable." Injuries that are conjectural, hypothetical, or based on an interest shared by the general public are not enough. If the plaintiff is not presently suffering an injury, the injury faced must be "imminent."

Wygant v. Lee, --- S.W.3d ---, 2025 WL 3537313, at *18 (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2025) (citations omitted); *see LaFollette Med. Ctr. v. City of LaFollette*, 115 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing *Patten*, 65 S.W. 414) ("The rule in Tennessee is well established that citizens and taxpayers are without standing to maintain a lawsuit to restrain or direct governmental action unless they first allege and establish that they will suffer some special injury not common to citizens and taxpayers generally.").

Petitioners first point to that very case quoted above, *Wygant*, 2025 WL 3537313, at *19, wherein the Supreme Court stated that "a voter residing in the allegedly gerrymandered district has standing to challenge that gerrymander because he has personally suffered those representational harms." Petitioners assert that they all therefore have standing because each Petitioner (or the members thereof in the case of NAACP Tennessee) is a voter in a district that has undergone redistricting. This Court believes Petitioners' reliance upon *Wygant* is misplaced. There, the Supreme Court expressly set out the distinction between an injury in fact and an injury in law by finding standing with respect to Mr. Wygant but not Ms. Hunt. *Id.* at *28. Mr. Wygant

challenged the state House redistricting map under Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution, which generally prohibits the splitting of counties to form state House districts from the pieces of partitioned counties except as necessary to comply with federal law. *See id.* at *17. Ms. Hunt challenged the state Senate redistricting map under Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution, which requires, if there are multiple senatorial districts in one county, those districts to be consecutively numbered. *Id.* These both constituted injuries in law, common to the citizenry. *See id.* at *16. The Court distinguished Mr. Wygant's additional allegation that the House map "den[ied] him the full-county representation" guaranteed by the Constitution and instead fractured the county's representation by ensuring that no House member represented the entire county. *Id.* at *18. The Court reasoned that this "representational injury" in the denial of a single representative to represent all of his county as contemplated by the Constitution was "a close question" but "sufficiently 'distinct and palpable' to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement." *See id.* at *18–19. In contrast, the Court rejected Ms. Hunt's "vote dilution" theory of injury as insufficient. *Id.* at *21. District numbering in no way altered the "weight or strength of her vote." *Id.* (emphasis omitted). The Court also rejected her framing of the injury as a "denial of staggered-term representati[on]" because only one of her county's Senate seats turned over in 2022 and so her injury was, "at best," a "mere possibility." *Id.*

Here, Petitioners allege they also have suffered a representational injury like Mr. Wygant because they all (or their members) live in districts that were rearranged by HB 7003. Unlike the constitutional preference for a county-wide representation in the state House, however, there is no similar constitutional provision for federal congressional districts. Nor are congressional districts considered any sort of comparable small polity. Petitioners have made no allegations that HB 7003 was enacted with racial animus to dilute the voting power of a minority group. In fact,

Petitioners bring no constitutional claim against HB 7003 at all. As discussed below, their constitutional claims are solely limited to the assertions that HB 7001 and HB 7002 exceeded the call of the Governor's Proclamation. Their allegations with respect to those challenges—of chaos and confusion resulting from changes to residency requirements, qualifying deadlines, and the authority of the General Assembly to redistrict at will—are alleged injuries common to the general citizenry.

Representative Chism additionally alleges that he and his fellow members of the Tennessee Black Caucus of State Legislators were ambushed by the majority in the General Assembly with the bills enacted during the special session.[5] Petitioners additionally argue that Representative Chism is prevented from exercising his responsibilities as a legislator when the General Assembly acts in an unconstitutional and unauthorized manner. Reply, at 5. The Tennessee Court of Appeals quite recently addressed a similar issue in *Harris v. Lee*, No. M2025-01915-COA-R9-CV, 2026 WL 1144357 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2026). There, the court explained:

> Under the legislative plaintiffs' approach, *any single legislator* who alleges the governor exceeded his or her authority under a statute or the constitution, even if no one was injured by the governor's actions, could bring suit based on not being able to vote regarding the governor's action. This would place the judiciary in the role of reviewing the legality of the governor's conduct as to anything to which a single legislator objects even if there is no injury. That is not the proper role of courts. The legislative plaintiffs' approach to standing also runs contrary to the basic functioning of a legislative body. By accepting the legislative plaintiffs' standing argument, this court would empower a minority of a legislative body to assume the mantle of the legislative body itself. The courts, not their colleagues, would be conferring the power to decide the position of the legislature and to act on behalf of the legislature, without any actual authorization by the legislative body to do so. In other words, the plaintiffs' approach to standing invites us to intrude upon both the executive and legislative branches.

[5] Representative Chism also alleges the challenged bills affected him as a candidate. We treat this question more fully with respect to Petitioner Hill because Representative Chism is running for re-election in his House district, not one of the federal congressional districts that were altered by HB 7003 or affected by HB 7001 (applies only to congressional districts and only in 2026) and HB 7002 (the repealed prohibition on mid-census redistricting only applied to federal House races). We find no injury in fact to Representative Chism as a candidate.

Id. at *5 (emphasis in original). For the same reasons, this Court must reject Petitioners' arguments as to Representative Chism.

With respect to Petitioner Hill, Respondents argue that he has no cognizable legal interest in running for office in the old boundaries of the 9th Congressional District or in casting a vote for a particular candidate, which in this case would be himself. Defs.' Supp. Resp. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Temp. Inj., at 9–10, May 15, 2026. The Court is aware of no authority that says otherwise and thus agrees with Respondents. Respondents' challenge to Petitioners' argument that Petitioner Hill has suffered the loss of his time and financial resources from the efforts of a congressional campaign that changed after the original deadline to qualify as a candidate had passed as retrospective and thus insufficient is, however, another matter. Petitioner Hill made vital decisions such as whether to run for office, where to spend his time, and how to spend money based upon the configuration of the district that was altered after the original qualifying deadline had passed by the bills produced from the special session. This is quite specific to Petitioner Hill, and it is concrete, not speculative. Moreover, the injury is not merely in the past but ongoing because his extensive efforts remain pointless unless the statutes that altered the course of his campaign are enjoined.

The Court concludes that NAACP Tennessee, Petitioner Sweet-Love, and Representative Chism have failed to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of a distinct and palpable injury. While it is a close call, under this unique set of circumstances and events, the Court concludes that Petitioner Hill has satisfied this requirement. Accordingly, the claims of NAACP Tennessee, Petitioner Sweet-Love, and Representative Chism are hereby **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

IV. Statutory Construction of HB 7003 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-16-102

Before reaching the constitutional question, which is discussed below, the Court wishes to address the fundamental problem with the merits of the Amended Petition that none of the parties have addressed. For purposes of this discussion, the Court will assume *arguendo* that HB 7001 and HB 7002 are unconstitutional and void *ab initio*. Thus, among other consequences, the prohibition of redistricting for federal congressional districts between censuses would remain in effect. In its prior form, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-16-102 (emphasis added) read as follows:

> The general assembly shall establish the composition of districts for the election of members of the house of representatives in congress after each enumeration and apportionment of representation by the congress of the United States. *The districts may not be changed between apportionments.*

Meanwhile, 2026 Tenn. Pub. Laws, Second Extraordinary Session, ch. 3, § 1 (HB 7003) changes those districts between apportionments.

That would leave the Court with two lawfully enacted and contradictory statutes. Petitioners argue Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-16-102 simply prohibits HB 7003. But that is not how statutes are construed. As stated above, they must be read "to provide for a harmonious operation of the laws," using "well-defined precepts." *Coffman*, 615 S.W.3d at 894 (citations omitted); *Frazier*, 558 S.W.3d at 153 (citation omitted).

Two canons of statutory construction would be applicable in this instance. The first is that when a general statute and a more specific statute are in conflict, the more specific statute controls in the circumstances it contemplates. *See Lawson v. Hawkins Cnty.,* 661 S.W.3d 54, 66–67 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting *Coffman*, 615 S.W.3d at 894) (alteration in original) ("But application of a well-settled canon of statutory construction resolves any contradiction between these provisions: '[W]here a conflict is presented between two statutes, a more specific statutory provision takes precedence over a more general provision.'"). The second is that "when 'two acts conflict and

cannot be reconciled, the prior act will be repealed or amended by implication to the extent of the inconsistency between the two.'" *Falls v. Goins*, 673 S.W.3d 173, 180 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting *Hayes v. Gibson Cnty.*, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn. 2009)) ("Nevertheless, '[r]epeals by implication . . . are disfavored in Tennessee' and are to 'be recognized only when no fair and reasonable construction will permit the statutes to stand together.'"). If Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-16-102 provides that "[t]he districts [for the election of members of the house of representatives in congress] may not be changed between apportionments [of representation]," HB 7003 doing precisely that would be a conflict. One conclusion could be that the General Assembly has repealed the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-16-102 by implication. Since that conclusion would be disfavored unless the two statutes are utterly irreconcilable, however, a safer conclusion would be that the prohibition remains in effect as the general rule but that HB 7003 constituted a more specific statute that created an exception for 2026. Under either scenario, no matter the merits of Petitioners' constitutional challenge, HB 7003 will stand. Accordingly, the Court holds that the statutory claim against HB 7003 is without merit and must be **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

V. Article III, Section 9 Challenge

The Court would assume that the redistricting itself accomplished by HB 7003 is the gravamen of the Amended Petition. Because some of the remaining Petitioner's alleged injuries were tied to the statutes challenged under Article III, Section 9, however, the Court will proceed to the constitutional question.

> [The Governor] may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly by proclamation, in which he shall state specifically the purposes for which they are to convene; but they shall enter on no legislative business except that for which they were specifically called together.

Tenn. Const. art. III, § 9. This authority is reasonably broad.[6] *See Deveraux v. City of Brownsville*, 29 F. 742, 747 (Cir. Ct., W.D. Tenn. 1887) (citing *Mitchell v. Franklin & Columbia Turnpike Co.*, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 456 (1842)) ("It was not the intention [of Article III, Section 9] to require the governor to define with precision, as to details, the subjects of legislation, but only in a general way, by his call, to confine the business to particular subjects."). But it is not unlimited. *See Columbia & Pulaski Turnpike Co. v. Hughes*, 174 S.W. 1108, 1108 (Tenn. 1915) (holding that "An act to regulate the operation and condition of turnpike roads in counties having a population of not less than 40,450 inhabitants nor more than 40,475 inhabitants according to the federal census

[6] Petitioners propose a much narrower reading of this constitutional provision based upon language that is not actually part of the Supreme Court's opinion in *Mitchell v. Franklin & Columbia Turnpike Co.*, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 456 (1842). They cite repeatedly from language at the top of the opinion, most specifically: "At a regular biennial session of the general assembly every presumption is in favor of the exercise of the authority, because they have all legislative power not prohibited by the constitution; but at a called or special session every presumption is against the exercise of all authority, because they do not assemble by command of the constitution, but by the proclamation of the executive, and they must look to the communications he makes to ascertain the extent of their power." *Id.* at 457. That appears to be what was argued. *See id.* At any rate, the actual opinion begins two pages later. *See id.* at 459. And the Court's reasoning is quite different than the prior quoted language:

> We can not say, in view of the message, that it was not competent for the legislature "to enter upon the business" thus submitted to their consideration, or that the provision in question is so remotely connected with that matter or "business" as not properly to spring out of the general subject.
>
> The governor or executive, with us, is in no degree, or in any sense, a part of the legislature, and has not, even at a called session, the initiation of bills. At such session, when he submits a general subject, and the legislature "enter upon the business" of legislating upon it, it will be found a difficult and invidious task to secure the character and details of their provisions, so as to determine them of too remote affinity with the message from which they arise.

Id. at 461–62. Similarly, Petitioners stated in both their briefing and at the hearing on this matter that the Supreme Court also struck down a statute under Article III, Section 9 in *State v. Woollen*, 161 S.W. 1006, 1007 (Tenn. 1913). The Court, in fact, reversed the trial court's determination that the statute in question violated Article III, Section 9. *See id.* at 1007, 1015–16. The Court, however, cannot fault Petitioners for their mistake given the peculiarity that Chief Justice Matthew M. Neil authored the opinion (as well as another decision that did strike down a statute under Article III, Section 9, *Columbia & Pulaski Turnpike Co. v. Hughes*, 174 S.W. 1108, 1108 (Tenn. 1915)), but was overruled by the rest of the Court as to its holding, thus becoming the only dissenter from his own opinion. *Woollen*, 161 S.W. at 1015–16 ("The majority of the court, however, while thoroughly approving the principles announced, are of the opinion that the writer has given to them an application which they do not support. The majority are of the opinion that the word 'maintain' as used in the Governor's call meant, if not direct maintenance by an appropriation to the agricultural department to be received and used by it, at least one under its own direction and control, and that it was not susceptible of any other or additional meaning, and that its intent could not find true expression in an appropriation to a separate institution or corporation to be expended by such separate institution or corporation, although such separate organization might be engaged in whole or in part in doing work for which the department was organized. The majority believe that the call was to appropriate money to the support of the department itself, and not in any sense to aid some other in doing work of the same kind.").

of 1910 or any subsequent federal census" did not fairly fit within (1) "Road law for Maury county," (2) "To amend the act creating a turnpike commission for Maury county," or (3) "to define and more effectively provide for the abatement of public nuisances, particularly any business occupation, practice, or device, forbidden by the laws of the state" from the Governor's proclamation because, while Maury County fell within that population, (1) "the expression 'Road law for Maury county' has no relation to an act for regulating turnpikes," (2) "it was not possible to 'amend the act creating a turnpike commission for Maury county,' for the reason that there was never any such act in existence," and (3) "there can be no doubt that [the third subject mentioned] referred to certain well–known public nuisances having no relation to turnpikes"); *Davidson v. Moorman*, 49 Tenn. 575 (2 Heisk.) (1870) (holding that a law extending the redemption of real estate was not within the "the military and political interests of the State" contemplated by the Governor's Proclamation that called the General Assembly into special session in April 1861).[7] Ultimately, the test "by which the language of the Governor's proclamation must be tested to determine whether the legislation under consideration was included therein is . . . that any piece of legislation so under consideration should be held within the call, if it can be done by any reasonable construction." *City of Rockwood v. Rogers*, 290 S.W. 381, 382 (Tenn. 1926) (quoting *State v. Woollen*, 161 S.W. 1006, 1014–15 (Tenn. 1913)).

Here, the Court believes bills to repeal a prohibition on redistricting and to ease various election requirements such as the residency requirement, qualifying deadlines, and notice requirements are fairly contained in the language "making statutory changes that are necessary to

[7] The Governor's Proclamation in that instance called the General Assembly into special session to "legislate upon such subjects as may then be submitted to them" in response to the "alarming and dangerous usurpation of power by the President of the United States [that] has precipitated a state of war between the sovereign States of America." *Senate Journal of the Second Extra Session of the Thirty-Third General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, which Convened at Nashville on Thursday, the 25th Day of April, A. D. 1861*, https://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/tennessee/tennessee.html.

effectuate changes to the composition of Tennessee's congressional districts and to facilitate 2026 congressional elections." Bill Lee, State of Tennessee, *Proclamation by the Governor*, at 1. Petitioners argue that the complete repeal of the prohibition on redistricting between censuses was not necessary when the General Assembly could have merely suspended it as it did with the other requirements. Petitioners also argue that those other requirements being relaxed actually make the 2026 Congressional Elections more difficult rather than easier for the candidates. Petitioners' approach would have the Judicial Branch micromanaging its coequal Legislative Branch and substituting this Court's judgment in place of the General Assembly's on a granular level as to the specific exercises of its authority by inquiring into whether a specific action was *actually* necessary to accomplish a particular goal or what the *best* methods of carrying out congressional elections are. This, the Court should not do. Moreover, it is neither equipped nor tasked to do so. It is with good reason that it is sufficient for purposes of Article III, Section 9 that the legislation enacted in a special session be reasonably contained within the call of the Governor. And the Court holds that HB 7001 and HB 7002 are reasonably contained within Governor Lee's Proclamation.

Because the Court finds no merit to Petitioner Hill's claims under Article III, Section 9, those claims must be **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that sovereign immunity bars Petitioners' claims against Governor Lee and the General Assembly but not against Secretary Hargett or Coordinator Goins. The Court concludes that Petitioners did not establish a distinct and palpable injury with respect to NAACP Tennessee, Petitioner Sweet-Love, and Representative Chism and thus those three Petitioners do not have standing to bring their claims. The Court also concludes that Petitioner Hill established a distinct and palpable injury, as well as traceability and redressability, and therefore has standing

to bring his claims against Secretary Hargett and Coordinator Goins. The Court further concludes that Petitioner Hill's statutory challenge to HB 7003 is without merit and that his constitutional challenges to HB 7001 and HB 7002 are also without merit.

Accordingly, the Court **ENTERS JUDGMENT** in favor of Respondents. This cause is **DISMISSED** with prejudice in its entirety. Costs of this action are assessed against Petitioners.

It is so ORDERED.

s/Anne C. Martin
CHANCELLOR ANNE C. MARTIN, CHIEF JUDGE

s/Tony Childress
CHANCELLOR TONY CHILDRESS

s/James Gass
JUDGE JAMES GASS

cc by U.S. Mail, fax, or e-filing as applicable to:

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RULE 58 CERTIFICATION

A copy of this Order has been served by U.S. Mail or the Court's Electronic Filing System upon all parties or their counsel named above.

s/Megan Carter
Deputy Clerk & Master

May 26, 2026
Date