Supreme Judicial Court

FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Worcester, ss. **NO. SJC-13284**

LOUISE BARRON, JACK BARRON and ARTHUR ST. ANDRE,

Appellants

v.

SOUTHBOROUGH BOARD OF SELECTMEN and TOWN OF SOUTHBOROUGH,

Appellees

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

AMICUS BRIEF (SOLICITED) OF MASSACHUSETTS ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL COMMITTEES IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES AND REQUESTING AFFIRMANCE

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CONCISE STATEMENT OF IDENTITY OF AMICUS CURIAE AND INTEREST

Pursuant to Mass.R.App.Pro. 17(c)(4), amicus curiae submits the following concise statement:

Amicus The Massachusetts Association of School Committees, Inc., ("MASC") is a Massachusetts corporation incorporated for one or more of the purposes set forth in G.L. c. 180, § 4. MASC's members consist of the approximately 320 Massachusetts school committees in cities, towns, and regional school districts. MASC represents the interests of its members in supporting and enhancing public elementary and secondary education within the Commonwealth. MASC's general interest in this case lies in ensuring that its member school committees are able to perform their statutory duties regarding their school districts through the orderly, efficient and productive conduct of open meetings required by G.L. c. 30A, §§ 18, et seq., while also obtaining relevant public input at those meetings from the residents and students/families of their school districts.

MASS.R.APP.PRO. 17(C)(5) DECLARATION OF AMICUS CURIAE

Pursuant to Mass.R.App.Pro. 17(c)(5), amicus curiae makes the following declaration:

(A) no party or a party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part;

(B) no party or a party's counsel, or any other person or entity other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief; and

(C) neither the amicus curiae or its counsel represents or has represented one of the parties to the present appeal in another proceeding involving similar issues or was a party or represented a party in a proceeding or legal transaction that is at issue in the present appeal.

ARGUMENT

This court has invited amicus briefs on two issues: (1) whether the "public comment" portion of the open meetings held by local boards in Massachusetts is a traditional, designated, or limited public forum; and (2) whether a policy regarding public comment at such meetings, as contained in the policy at issue in this case, is a constitutional, permissible prohibition on speech.

Amicus urges affirmance of the Superior Court's judgement that the defendant-appellee select board's "public comments" policy complies with the "right of free speech" contained in Article 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Amicus and its member school committees have a vital interest in ensuring that the "public comment" sessions that they voluntarily establish as part of their open meetings required by Massachusetts law may be appropriately regulated so that their essential business of operating the public education programs in their districts can be conducted efficiently and in an orderly manner – all while at the same time they are able to obtain valued public feedback regarding those programs. Affirmance of the judgment will allow the accomplishment of both purposes.

As a preliminary matter amicus asserts that the Superior Court correctly used basic First Amendment forum analysis to resolve the claim alleging a violation of the "right of free speech" contained in Article 16 [A. 148-149]. The trial court did so citing and quoting the decision in *Roman v. Trustees of Tufts College*, 461 Mass. 707, 713-715 (2012) [A. 148-149]. In *Roman*, this court acknowledged the rule that generally "the rights guaranteed by art. 16 [are] coextensive with the First Amendment" but, because the forum at issue involved private property and private actors, cautioned against an assumption that Article 16 can never "'extend further'" than the First Amendment. *Id*. at 713 [citation omitted]. Having made that point, however, this court declined to address whether the speech guarantee in Article 16 can be applied to private property actors, unlike that in the First Amendment. Instead, the court took up the question of forum analysis. *Id*. at 713-715. In that analysis *Roman* used First Amendment decisions to define the different types of fora and the general rules applicable to each. Accordingly, this court recognized as applicable to Article 16 the First Amendment category of "limited public forums, which are 'limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.'" *Id.* at 714

[citation omitted]. *Roman* then applied to Article 16 the First Amendment's general standards for this category of forum, holding that speech regulations "need only be 'reasonable and viewpoint neutral'"; that a regulation "is deemed viewpoint neutral if it 'serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . , even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others'"; and that "restrictions on access to a limited public forum 'need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.'" *Id.* at 714-715 [citations omitted]. Measured by the standards articulated in *Roman*, the Superior Court reached the correct result.

I. THIS COURT SHOULD RULE THAT THE ARTICLE 16 SPEECH RIGHT AT "PUBLIC COMMENT" SESSIONS DURING THE OPEN MEETINGS OF LOCAL BOARDS/ COMMITTEES IS MEASURED BY THE STANDARDS THAT APPLY TO LIMITED PUBLIC FORA

The Superior Court concluded that the "public comment" session at issue in this case constituted a "limited public forum" because the board's policy provided that this portion of its meetings "was opened for local residents to discuss matters related to the town that were not on the Board's agenda" [A. 149 & n.7]. The court's ruling is immune from any credible challenge. As this court observed in *Roman*, "a 'defining characteristic' of a limited public forum is that

the forum may be reserved 'for certain groups.'" *Roman*, supra, 461 Mass. at 715.

The Open Meeting Law effectively channels "public comment" sessions at meetings of local boards and committees into the category of a limited public forum. While the statute says nothing about these sessions and in fact they are entirely voluntary, it defines the term "meeting" as "a deliberation by a public body *with respect to any matter within the body's jurisdiction*". G.L. c. 30A, § 18 [emphasis added]. The "jurisdiction" of the school committees represented by amicus is limited by law in ways that presumptively justify restriction of public comment access to residents and restriction of public comment topics to matters within the committee's legal authority.

A school committee's "jurisdiction" in Massachusetts is carefully defined. The school committee is responsible for establishing the policies and overseeing the operations of the school district within its municipality.[1] *See, e.g.,* G.L. c. 71, § 37, providing that school committees

[1] Regional school districts are comprised of the specific towns that enter into the regional school district agreement, and the school committee's responsibilities apply to the schools within the member towns. *See* G.L. c. 71, §§ 15, 16, and 16A.

> have the power to *select and to terminate the superintendent*, shall *review and approve budgets for public education in the district*, and shall *establish educational goals and policies for the schools in the district* consistent with the requirements of law and statewide goals and standards established by the board of education [emphasis added]

Also within the committee's systemwide portfolio are specific statutory responsibilities that implicate district policies. These include the acceptance of gifts and grants for educational purposes, G.L. c. 71, §37A; adopting requirements that protect the health and safety of students and staff, G.L. c. 71, §§ 37H, 37Q, and 57; oversight of the district's special education program for students with disabilities, G.L. c. 71B, § 3; the annual determination as to whether the district will participate in the Massachusetts school choice program, G.L. c. 76, § 12B(d); the determination of the district's labor relations policy as the municipal "employer" in all aspects of collective bargaining with the district's bargaining units that represent school employees, G.L. c. 150E, § 1; and the approval of private schools that operate within the district based on compatibility with the district's curriculum and program requirements and standards, G.L. c. 76, § 1.

On the other hand, certain functions that the school committee had performed before 1993 were reassigned within the district by the 1993 Education Reform Law, St. 1993, chapter 71. That statute

> refocused the function of the school committee by removing the day-to-day operational responsibilities formerly required of the committee--such as hiring, disciplining, and terminating most of the district's employees--and redirecting the school committee's focus toward setting district policies and goals. This refocusing resulted in school committees relying on their superintendents and principals for day-to-day operations and making the necessary operational decisions to carry out district policies. School committees now hold their managers--superintendents and principals--responsible and accountable for meeting their districts' goals.

School Law in Massachusetts, "Powers and Responsibilities of the School Committee" (MCLE), Nicholas J. Dominello and Elizabeth B. Valerio, § 2.1 at 2-2 (4th ed. 2022).

As a consequence, following the 1993 changes there are certain areas that are no longer within the school committee's "jurisdiction" and, therefore, are not appropriate topics at its meetings. For example, committee meetings do not directly involve the performance of individual district employees other than those specific positions that the committee is charged with hiring and evaluating, including the

superintendent, the business administrator, the administrator of the district's special education program, and the district's medical staff. *See* G.L. c. 71, §§ 59, 41, 53; G.L. c. 71B, § 3A. Likewise, issues within individual schools that do not implicate district policies and issues that involve individual students are not within the committee's purview. The latter category of issues also generally involves matters that are prohibited from public disclosure. *See* 20 U.S.C., § 1232(g) ("FERPA") and 34 CFR Part 99, regarding "education records"; 603 CMR 23.00, regarding "student records".

Accordingly, restriction of "public comment" sessions during school committee meetings (1) to residents and families of the school district and (2) to topics that relate to the committee's duties and responsibilities is both eminently logical and highly appropriate.

Other courts have recognized that the "public comment" portion of a local school board meeting is a limited public forum under the First Amendment if the board restricts who can speak and restricts the topics to matters within the board's purview. *See Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. School Dist*., 597 F.3d 747, 759 (5th Cir. 2010) ("'Plainly public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter …' and the Board meeting here fits the hornbook definition of a

limited -- not designated -- public forum, in which 'the State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech.'" [citations omitted]); *Davison v. Rose*, 19 F.4th 626, 635 (4th Cir. 2021), *cert. denied* No. 21-1532 (2022) (because "the school board meetings were limited public fora" the board was "justified 'in reserving its forum for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.'" [citation omitted]); *Barrett v. Walker County School Dist*., 872 F.3d 1209, 1225 (11th Cir. 2017) ("the public-comment portions of the Board meetings and planning sessions fall into the category of limited public fora because the Board limits discussion to certain topics and employs a system of selective access").

Policies such as the select board policy challenged in this case that govern the "public comment" portions of a school committee meeting and that define who may speak and the subjects they may address clearly establish a limited public forum. Accordingly, so long as the rules that control these sessions are "'reasonable and viewpoint neutral'", they do not run afoul of the "right of free speech" that is protected by Article 16. *Roman, supra*, 467 Mass. at 714 [citation omitted].

II. AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 16 IN HARMONY WITH THE OPEN MEETING LAW SHOULD PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE CONTROL OVER SPEECH AND CONDUCT BY THE CHAIR DURING "PUBLIC COMMENT" SESSIONS SO THAT THE VITAL BUSINESS OF SCHOOL COMMITTEES CAN BE CONDUCTED EFFICIENTLY AND PRODUCTIVELY

The Superior Court held that the policy at issue in this case is valid under Article 16 because its prohibition of "rude, personal, or slanderous remarks" is directly tied to the policy's overarching requirement that "[n]o person shall disrupt the proceedings of a meeting" [A. 150-151].[2] The court ruled that this is a "reasonable, viewpoint-and-content neutral restriction that serves the legitimate government interest of preventing disruption of the Board's meetings", citing *Roman, supra*, 461 Mass. at 715 [A. 150-151]. The court therefore declared that the policy's prohibition on the specified speech complies with Article 16 "when it is employed to maintain order and decorum or to prevent disruption of the Board's meeting" [A. 151]. This analysis is a correct application of Article 16 in harmony with the Open Meeting Law. Amicus urges this court to affirm the trial court's judgment on that basis.

[2] The policy also bars "shouting" [A. 65].

The Open Meeting Law requires these public meetings of local committees and boards and specifies how they are governed. Notably, the statute expressly authorizes control by the body over participants' conduct during the meetings. G.L. c. 30A, § 20(g) provides as follows:

> No person shall address a meeting of a public body without permission of the chair, and all persons shall, at the request of the chair, be silent. *No person shall disrupt the proceedings of a meeting of a public body*. *If, after clear warning from the chair, a person continues to disrupt the proceedings, the chair may order the person to withdraw from the meeting* and if the person does not withdraw, the chair may authorize a constable or other officer to remove the person from the meeting. [emphasis added]

Nothing in the statute remotely suggests that the voluntary addition of a "public comment" session to the meeting is exempt from this express grant of control to the local body. Indeed, a conclusion to the contrary defies common sense and would defeat the legislative intent. So long as the means of control is "'reasonable and viewpoint neutral'", *i.e.*, it furthers "'purposes'" that are "'unrelated'" to the views being expressed, it complies with Article 16. *Roman, supra*, 461 Mass. at 714-715 [citations omitted]. Moreover, and as already noted, the means chosen ""need not be the most reasonable or the

only reasonable limitation.'" *Id.* at 715 [citation omitted]. The Superior Court's analysis easily fits the standard. Decisions of federal courts that have applied the First Amendment in the context of local school board meetings support this conclusion.

For example, in *Davison*, *supra*, 19 F. 4th 626, the court sustained a local school board's public comments policy. The policy prohibited comments "'that are harassing or amount to a personal attack against any identifiable individual'" for the stated reason that they have the "'potential for causing unnecessary delay or disruption'" and that the prohibition "'allow[s] the Board to transact business in an orderly, effective, efficient and dignified manner.'" *Id.* at 635. *Davison* held that the policy "is viewpoint neutral, and the restriction is reasonable in light of the purpose" of the local board. *Id.* The court found the restriction "viewpoint neutral" because the policy "prohibits all personal attacks, regardless of viewpoint" and found it "reasonable" because it "further[s] the forum's purpose of good business." *Id.* at 635-636.

Another example is *Fairchild*, *supra*, 597 F.3d 747. There, the court was confronted with a challenge to a school board policy that was used to prevent an employee from speaking during its meeting

about her dispute with another employee. The court found that the policy's prohibition was "viewpoint neutral" because "[t]here is no evidence that the … school board discriminates *based on the view or identity of a given speaker*." *Id*. at 760 [emphasis added]. It found the restriction "reasonable" because the board "has a legitimate interest, if not state-law duty, to protect student and teacher privacy and to avoid naming or shaming as potential frustration of its conduct of business." *Id*. [3]

Amicus submits that the reasoning in decisions such as these, and not that in any First Amendment decisions by other courts that may conflict, should be applied by this court as the appropriate standard under Article 16. The "right of free speech" guaranteed by that provision can be exercised fully but also in harmony with the Open Meeting Law. No speaker will be prevented from expressing their views and opinions about school district policies – whether those perspectives are critical, complimentary, or neutral. At the same time other speakers and attendees can be assured that their own views and

[3] Likewise, a general limit on the amount of time each speaker may use, applied to speakers regardless of identity, is inherently "viewpoint neutral". It also is "reasonable" because it is directed solely at facilitating the efficient and orderly conduct of the meeting.

presence will be treated respectfully, and school committees will be able to handle important school district business effectively and efficiently.

School committees and their volunteer members are responsible for the vital task of ensuring that the children in their districts receive an education that equips them for fruitful lives. It is essential that the meetings at which this business is transacted are orderly and productive. Many Massachusetts school committees hold a regular meeting subject to the Open Meeting Law once every two weeks during the school year. These meetings take place in the evening and time obviously is at a premium for accomplishing the committee's required business. Moreover, these meetings are attended by students, families, and staff, and frequently feature student and staff presentations. A policy that minimizes disruption that is caused by the use of abusive, intimidating, threatening, or harassing conduct and speech serves an essential purpose. Such a policy is not aimed at preventing criticism of public officials, and its restriction on certain types of speech has nothing to do with the perspective or opinion of

the speaker on public issues.[4] Significantly, and as suggested above, that policy does not merely limit disruptive speech directed at public officials. Equally important, it also limits disruptive speech targeting students, employees, residents, and other speakers exercising their own right to express views and opinions. In addition, all speakers who engage in the proscribed conduct are subject to the same rules without regard to their identity, without regard to whether they support or disagree with the school committee's actions, and without regard to whether their views on public issues are widely shared or are unpopular in the community.

The Open Meeting Law, G.L. c. 30A, § 20(g), also provides for a "clear warning" by the committee chair before the speaker is silenced, giving the speaker an ample opportunity to express his or her views without engaging in disruptive actions. Finally, such a policy does not diminish "the alternatives that remain available for exercising free speech", such as written communication to the committee, speaking freely in traditional public fora within the

[4] For example, a valid policy can clearly state that criticism of or disagreement with the school committee's actions or policies are not, standing alone, within the categories of restricted speech.

district, or accessing local media venues and social media. *Roman*, *supra*, 461 Mass. at 715.

Unfortunately, during the past two years the pandemic has dramatically exacerbated the numbers and types of disruptive incidents at meetings of local school boards around the country. Angered by mask mandates that have been adopted to protect students and staff or driven by hyperbole and distortion regarding curriculum, some members of the public have engaged in verbal abuse, intimidation, threats of violence, and other forms of disruption at these meetings that have become all too common. *See* Talbot, "The Increasingly Wild World of School Board Meetings", *The New Yorker*, October 8, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-increasingly-wild-world-of-school-board-meetings, describing meetings where attendees "boo and jeer at people who express an opinion different from theirs [and] find ways to bring up and rant about child-trafficking conspiracies", and where students have "'been on the agenda at some points, but they're being frozen out of the discussion because parents are shouting and yelling and cops have to clear them out'"; *Reuters Investigates*, "School Boards Get Death Threats Amid Rage Over Race, Gender, Mask Policies",

Feb, 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-education-threats/, stating "[n]early half of the 31 school boards contacted by Reuters said they had added extra security at meetings, limited public comment or held virtual meetings when in-person gatherings became too chaotic." Incidents such as these have forced the National School Boards Association and the School Superintendents Association to issue a joint statement calling for an end to behavior that has caused "increasingly tense public forums". *See* https://www.nsba.org/News/2021/end-threats-violence-joint-statement.

The school committees represented by amicus value input from the residents and families in their communities. Even though the Open Meeting Law does not require a "public comment" session, committees offer these opportunities to obtain this important feedback. The majority of citizens who attend the meetings of amicus's members do so in a civil manner and express their views and opinions on the issues vigorously without resorting to disruptive conduct and speech. But increasingly there are some who see an opportunity for ad hominem vituperation and active interference with the orderly transaction of school district business.

A decision that reverses the judgment of the Superior Court would confront school committees with a choice between two equally poor options. Either they must hold public comment sessions unarmed with reasonable tools to ensure that their meetings are orderly, efficient and productive, or they must forego the sessions altogether so that the meetings facilitate the transaction of vital school business. Neither result is remotely in the public interest.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, amicus urges this court to affirm the Superior Court's judgment.

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Date: October 4, 2022

ADDENDUM

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Part I ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

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Section 20 MEETINGS OF A PUBLIC BODY TO BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC; NOTICE OF MEETING; REMOTE PARTICIPATION; RECORDING AND TRANSMISSION OF MEETING; REMOVAL OF PERSONS FOR DISRUPTION OF PROCEEDINGS; OFFICE HOLDERS TO CERTIFY RECEIPT OF OPEN MEETING LAW AND EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS

[Section impacted by 2020, 53, Sec. 17, as amended by 2020, 201, Secs. 33 to 38 effective November 10, 2020, and 2021, 20, Secs. 20, 27 and 31 as amended by 2021, 29, Sec. 57 and 2022, 22, Secs. 8 to 10 effective June 16, 2021 in order to address disruptions caused by the outbreak of COVID-19.]

Section 20. (a) Except as provided in section 21, all meetings of a public body shall be open to the public.

(b) Except in an emergency, in addition to any notice otherwise required by law, a public body shall post notice of every meeting at least 48 hours prior to the meeting, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. In an emergency, a public body shall post notice as soon as reasonably possible prior to the meeting. Notice shall be printed in a

legible, easily understandable format and shall contain the date, time and place of the meeting and a listing of topics that the chair reasonably anticipates will be discussed at the meeting.

(c) For meetings of a local public body, notice shall be filed with the municipal clerk and posted in a manner conspicuously visible to the public at all hours in or on the municipal building in which the clerk's office is located.

For meetings of a regional or district public body, notice shall be filed and posted in each city or town within the region or district in the manner prescribed for local public bodies. For meetings of a regional school district, the secretary of the regional school district committee shall be considered to be its clerk and shall file notice with the clerk of each city or town within the district and shall post the notice in the manner prescribed for local public bodies. For meetings of a county public body, notice shall be filed in the office of the county commissioners and a copy of the notice shall be publicly posted in a manner conspicuously visible to the public at all hours in the places as the county commissioners shall designate for the purpose.

For meetings of a state public body, notice shall be filed with the attorney general by posting on a website under the procedures established for this purpose and a duplicate copy of the notice shall be filed with the regulations division in the state secretary's office.

The attorney general may prescribe or approve alternative methods of notice where the attorney general determines the alternative methods will afford more effective notice to the public.

(d) The attorney general may, by regulation or letter ruling, authorize

remote participation by members of a public body not present at the meeting location; provided, however, that the absent members and all persons present at the meeting location are clearly audible to each other; and provided further, that a quorum of the body, including the chair, are present at the meeting location. The authorized members may vote and shall not be deemed absent for the purposes of section 23D of chapter 39.

(e) A local commission on disability may by majority vote of the commissioners at a regular meeting authorize remote participation applicable to a specific meeting or generally to all of the commission's meetings. If a local commission on disability is authorized to utilize remote participation, a physical quorum of that commission's members shall not be required to be present at the meeting location; provided, however, that the chair or, in the chair's absence, the person authorized to chair the meeting, shall be physically present at the meeting location. The commission shall comply with all other requirements of law.

(f) After notifying the chair of the public body, any person may make a video or audio recording of an open session of a meeting of a public body, or may transmit the meeting through any medium, subject to reasonable requirements of the chair as to the number, placement and operation of equipment used so as not to interfere with the conduct of the meeting. At the beginning of the meeting, the chair shall inform other attendees of any recordings.

(g) No person shall address a meeting of a public body without permission of the chair, and all persons shall, at the request of the chair, be silent. No person shall disrupt the proceedings of a meeting of a public body. If, after clear warning from the chair, a person continues to

disrupt the proceedings, the chair may order the person to withdraw from the meeting and if the person does not withdraw, the chair may authorize a constable or other officer to remove the person from the meeting.

(h) Within 2 weeks of qualification for office, all persons serving on a public body shall certify, on a form prescribed by the attorney general, the receipt of a copy of the open meeting law, regulations promulgated under section 25 and a copy of the educational materials prepared by the attorney general explaining the open meeting law and its application under section 19. Unless otherwise directed or approved by the attorney general, the appointing authority, city or town clerk or the executive director or other appropriate administrator of a state or regional body, or their designees, shall obtain certification from each person upon entering service and shall retain it subject to the applicable records retention schedule where the body maintains its official records. The certification shall be evidence that the member of a public body has read and understands the requirements of the open meeting law and the consequences of violating it.

MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION

PART THE FIRST

A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Article LXXVII.

Article XVI of Part the First is hereby annulled and the following is adopted in place thereof:

Article XVI. The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right of free speech shall not be abridged.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this Brief complies with the applicable rules, including the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure listed in Mass.R.App.Pro. 16(k). I certify that this Brief complies with the limits for proportionally spaced font under Mass.R.App.Pro. 20(a)(2) regarding the parts required by Mass.R.App.Pro. 16(a)(5-11) because those portions are produced in Times New Roman font at 14 point and contain 3,265 unexcluded words including footnotes, headings, and quotes, determined by the "word count" feature of Microsoft Word.

John Foskett
Dated: October 4, 2022

Supreme Judicial Court

FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Worcester, ss. **NO. SJC-13284**

LOUISE BARRON, JACK BARRON and ARTHUR ST. ANDRE,

Appellants

v.

SOUTHBOROUGH BOARD OF SELECTMEN and TOWN OF SOUTHBOROUGH,

Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

John Foskett, counsel for Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Association of School Committees hereby certifies that he has served the Amicus Brief (Solicited) of Massachusetts Association of School Committees in Support of Appellees and Requesting Affirmance by causing a copy thereof to be delivered by electronic filing to Appellees' counsel John J. Davis and Appellants' counsel Ginny Sinkel Kremer and Christopher J. Alphen.

John Foskett

John Foskett

Date: October 4, 2022