Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Planned Parenthood Great Northwest

Docket number
53C06-2208-PL-1756
Date

Medical care providers claim that abortion ban violates the state constitution’s 1) substantive due process right to privacy included in the inalienable rights clause (Art. I, § 1), 2) guarantee of equal privileges and immunities (Art. I, § 23), and 3) due course of law clause through its unconstitutionally vague language (Art. I, § 12). A trial court preliminarily blocked the ban. After keeping the injunction temporarily in place while it heard an appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled on the merits of whether the Indiana Constitution protects a right to abortion and vacated the trial court’s preliminary injunction. According to the court, the state constitution’s due process right to privacy (Art. I, § 1) does not protect the right to abortion except when necessary to protect the patient’s life or to protect a patient from a serious health risk. Though the state high court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had previously withdrawn their vagueness claim (Art. I, § 12), it declined to rule on their privileges and immunities claim (Art. I, § 23) since that claim was not part of the appeal. 

Although the high court concluded the plaintiffs’ facial Art. 1, § 1 challenge to the abortion ban could not proceed, it left open the possibility of an as-applied challenge based on particlar circumstances. On remand, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to make such a challenge based on a set of six specific circumstances, in which they allege the life or health of a patient is at serious risk by pregnancy but the ban would appear to prohibit obtaining an abortion. They also challenged a statutory amendment generally requiring all abortions to be performed in a hospital setting.

A trial court entered a final judgment denying the amended complaint, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed.  The intermediate court found that because all the health conditions identified by the plaintiffs can be treated by reasonable medical means other than an abortion up until each condition becomes so extreme that an abortion is necessary to either save the patient’s life or prevent a serious risk of organ damage, there is no point at which the limited constitutional right recognized by the Indiana Supreme Court is available but not a medical exception in the ban. The court also held that the “reasonable medical judgment” standard in the statutory exception, as well as the new hospital requirement, did not materially burden that limited constitutional right.

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